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"Autonomy means not separation but union between the self
governing ... peoples and the peoples of Russia." - Stalin to the
North Caucasus peoples in 1920.1
Over the last 10 years, the Russian Federation has instituted
significant changes affecting the structure and management of the
country as well as the lives of its inhabitants. In the late 1980s,
Mikhail Gorbachev instituted the policies of Glasnost and Peres-
* Mr. Todd Frommeyer graduated cum laude from the Salmon P. Chase College of
Law in 1997. Thereafter, he received an LL.M. in International Economic Law from the
University of Houston Law Center in 1998. Before attending law school, Mr. Frommeyer
developed extensive experience as a Russian interpreter/translator with the United States
Navy. He was also an arms control inspector for the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA).
While-acting in that capacity, his duties included interpretation/translation of diplomatic
exchanges between American and Russian scientists and military under the auspices of
U.S. treaties with the former Soviet Union.
The Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal was unable
to obtain English translations for certain Russian source material cited in this Article. Ac-
cordingly, the Journal relies on the author's representations as to the accuracy of these
sources.
1. ROBERT CONQUEST, SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN PRACTICE 32 (1967)
[hereinafter NATIONALITIES].
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troika2 to breathe life into the moribund Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR).3 These policies, however, failed to help the
Communist Party maintain its hold on the country and instead
precipitated the Party's disintegration.
The Russian people faced two traumatic upheavals when the
Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s. First, there was no
longer an authoritarian government to control every aspect of the
peoples' lives. Instead, the Russian people were thrust into a
world of democracy and capitalism. This change brought unex-
pected repercussions. Although capitalism brought an end to the
infamous queues of people waiting to buy goods, it also brought
wage arrears and inflation that destroyed the value of peoples'
pensions. In addition, it-brought corruption, crime and the rise of
a "Robber Baron" class of capitalists, commonly known as the
"Oligarchs." 4 Russians have very little experience with these phe-
nomena, and are hard pressed to deal with them in the infancy of
their new Republic.
Second, the change substantially altered the Russian peoples'
self-perception. Until recently, the Soviet Union was an acknowl-
edged superpower consisting of fifteen republics, of which Russia
was just one. Today, Russia is independent from the other four-
teen former Soviet republics and is a sovereign nation in its own
right.
The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR)5
once dominated the former Soviet Union; however, post-Soviet
Russia now pays a price for that domination. Russia affirmed the
Soviet Union's treaty obligations and accepted responsibility for a
majority of its foreign debt. In exchange, Russia retained the So-
viet Union's seat in many international organizations, including
the United Nations. Somewhere in the course of the handover,
however, Russia lost the mantle of "superpower."
2. Perestroika and Glasnost were introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 27th Party
Congress in 1986. See ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
18 (1997) [hereinafter AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION].
3. See KONST. USSR [Constitution, 1936] ch. I, art. I.
4. The Oligarchs are the group of rich bankers and businessmen who have been the
main recipients of Russia's so-called "crony capitalism." This handful of men, led by Boris
Berezovsky and Vladimir Potanin, now control much of the business and trade that takes
place in Russia. See Alex Dehgan, Federalism, Regionalism and Sovereignty in Russia, 5
SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 1, 13 (1994).
5. See id. at 15.
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Many Russians believe this was a poor trade-off. The loss of
"superpower" status is a blow to the Russian peoples' collective
psyche. They are no longer feared on the world stage. Even
worse, accepting responsibility for the Soviet Union's foreign debt
threatens to cripple the Russian economy within the next few
years.
6
Amidst this chaos, Russia has attempted to build a modem
constitutional structure befitting of a large and still very powerful
country. Its 1993 Constitution, 7 adopted by popular referendum,
was controversial, but seemed to address all of the major issues
raised in a modem government and legal system. 8 Soon, however,
the "subjects," 9 or regions, of the newly constituted Russian Fed-
eration began to threaten this constitutional foundation. This
threat instigated the signing of Power-Sharing Treaties between
the federation and the regions. The first agreement was signed
with Tatarstan 10 in 1994. Today, Russia has agreements with over
one-half of the regions recognized by the Russian Constitution.
This Article will analyze the effect of these Power-Sharing
Treaties on the Russian Constitutional structure. To that end, Part
I will examine the history of the regions from creation to their pre-
sent-day existence as subjects of the Russian Federation. This sec-
tion will also discuss the events that precipitated the central gov-
ernment's decision to shore up its constitutional structure by
signing Power-Sharing Treaties. Part II will present a detailed
analysis of the Power-Sharing Treaties." Moreover, this section
6. Russia made various agreements to forestall most of the payments on its foreign
debt until 2002. At that time, the full burden will fall on the country. See id.
7. See generally KONST. RF (1993).
8. ROBERT AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 73.
9. The term "subjects," which will be used frequently throughout this Article, is a
direct translation from the Russian term used in the Treaties.
10. See Steven Solnick, Federal Bargaining in Russia, 4 E. EUR. CONST. L. REV. 52
(1995).
11. As of the writing of this Article, the Russian Federation has signed "Dogovory o
razgranichenii predmetov vedeniya i polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi
vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti ee sub" ektov (Treaties on
the delimitation of jurisdiction and powers between the organs of state power of the Rus-
sian Federation and the organs of governmental power of its subjects), or Power-Sharing
Treaties with the following regions: Republics - Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkar, Bashkor-
tostan, Northern Ossetia-Alaniya, Sakha (Yakutiya), Buryatiya, Udmurtiya, Komi, Chu-
vash; Krais - Krasnodarsk, Khabarovsk, Altai; Oblasts - Kaliningrad, Sverdlovsk, Oren-
burg, Omsk, Irkutsk, Sakhalin, Perm, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov, Leningrad, Tver,
Vologda, Chelyabinsk, Saratov, Magadan, Bryansk, Ulyanovsk; Federal Cities - St. Pe-
tersburg; Autonomous Okrugs - Ust'-Ordinsk Buryat, Komi-Permyat. See Mikhail Gubo-
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will examine the overlap of the Treaties with certain sections of
the Russian Constitution, particularly articles 72 and 76. Finally,
Part III will review these Treaties and the Russian Constitution
within the framework of Russian federalism. Specifically, this sec-
tion will examine the asymmetrical federalism created by the Rus-
sian Constitution and the impact of the Power-Sharing Treaties on
that federalism.
I. THE BIRTH OF POWER-SHARING TREATIES
A. The Creation of Regions
On December 12, 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Fed-
eration was approved by a national referendum, supplanting the
RSFSR's 1978 constitution. 12 The 1993 Constitution established a
federal structure that accommodates eighty-nine subjects of the
Russian Federation.13 This federal structure recognizes republics,
krais,14 oblasts15 (including one autonomous oblast), federal cities,
and autonomous okrugs.!6
glo, Federalizm Viasti i Vlast' Federalizma, in FEDERALIZM VLASTI I VLAST'
FEDERALIZMA 108 (1997) [hereinafter FEDERALIZM].
12. This constitution will be referred to as the 1993 Constitution. See GORDON B.
SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 281-82 (1996).
13. See KONST. RF (1993) art. 65. The subjects of the Russian Federation are as fol-
lows: Republics - Adygeya, Altai, Bashkortostan, Buryatiya, Dagestan, Ingush, Kabardin-
Balkar, Kalmykia-Khalmg Tangch, Karachayevo-Cherkess, Karelia, Komi, Mari-el, Mor-
dovia, Sakha (Yakutiya), North Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurt, Khakasia, Chechnya,
Chuvash. Krais - Altai, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Maritime (Primorskii), Stavropol,
Khabarovsk. Oblasts - Amur, Arkhangelsk, Astrakhan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Vladimir,
Volgograd, Vologda, Voronezh, Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Kamchatka, Ke-
merovo, Kirov, Kostroma, Kurgan, Kursk, Leningrad, Lipetsk, Magadan, Moscow, Mur-
mansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orenburg, Oryol, Penza, Perm,
Pskov, Rostov, Ryazan, Samara, Saratov, Sakhalin, Sverdlovsk, Smolensk, Tambov, Tver,
Tomsk, Tula, Tyumen, Ulyanovsk, Chelyabinsk, Chita, Yaroslavl. Federal Cities - Mos-
cow, St. Petersburg. Autonomous areas (Oblasts and Okrugs) - Jewish, Aginsky Buryat,
Komi-Permyak, Koryak, Nenets, Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets), Ust Ordynsky Buryat, Khanty-
Mansi, Chukchi, Evenk, Yamal-Nenets. See id
14. Throughout this Article, I will use the Russian term for the respective administra-
tive division of the Russian Federation. While "territory" is often used as a definition for
kra, the word krai is also acceptable when referring to the regional designation.
15. Oxford Russian-English Dictionary defines oblast' as a province, region, or dis-
trict. See OXFORD RUSSIAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1989).
16. Okrug can mean region or district. When differentiating between Autonomous
oblastand Autonomous okrug, the latter is often referred to as area and the former a re-
gion. The Avtonomnii Okrug (Autonomous Area) is defined as a national - governmental
formation in the USSR which is located within another administrative division, such as a
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Generally speaking, the regions are the Russian successors to
the Soviet Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs). 17 In
the Soviet hierarchy of administrative divisions, the ASSRs were
considered the most autonomous of the administrative regions. 18
Republics, autonomous oblasts, and okrugs are determined pri-
marily on the basis of the minority populations concentrated in the
region. In contrast, oblasts and krais are generic administrative di-
visions and have no particular basis for their formation. Krais are
located mostly in the East (except Krasnodarsk krai in the North-
ern Caucasus) and usually contain an autonomous oblast or ok-
rug.
19
As mentioned above, Russia created some subdivisions in re-
sponse to the concentration of minority populations in the region.
Russia adopted this strategy because both the original Russian
Empire and, later, the Soviet Union, were comprised of approxi-
mately 130 nations and nationalities. 20 To keep minorities content
within the Soviet Union, Russia gave some areas (republics,
autonomous oblasts and okrugs) special designations and in-
creased autonomy in the day-to-day operations of their "home-
land. "21
krai or oblast. Avtonomnii Okrugs were created as national areas in locations of concen-
trations of minority populations in the North and Far East. See KRATKII POLITICHESKII
SLOVAR' (SHORT POLITICAL DICTIONARY) 8 (1989).
17. See Mordovian Republic (visited Oct.6,1998)
<http//www.rusline.com/oblast/mordovia/mordov.html>; see also Encyclopaedia Iranica:
Digorr (visited Oct. 6, 1998)
<http://internetserver.com/-iranica/articles/v7f4/v7f444.html>; see also NATIONALITIES,
supra note 1, at 31-32. Examples exist where regions formerly designated as ASSRs gen-
erally became republics. Before 1993, the Mordovian Republic was known as the Mordo-
vian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Similarly, the North Ossetia-Alania Republic
was formerly the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Furthermore,
the Autonomous Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic is now known as the Tatarstan Republic.
See also Alex Dehgan, Federalism, Regionalism, and Sovereignty in Russia, 5 Seton Hall
Const. L.J. 1, at 16 (1994).
18. See Zeljko Heimer, Russian Federation, (last modified Aug. 9, 1997)
http://www.chez.com/fotw/flags/rsf.html>.
19. See id.
20. See NATIONALITIES, supra note 1, at 13; see also Robert Sharlet, The Prospects
for Federalism in Russian Constitutional Politics, 24 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF
FEDERALISM 118 (1994) [hereinafter Sharlet, Prospects].
21. See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 108. Republics were divided by ethnicity or na-
tionality and the other regions were created for territorial or national-territorial reasons.
See id,
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Although Russia has changed many of the designations over
the years,22 the 1993 Constitution recognizes the same essential
structure of republics, krais, oblasts and autonomous okrugs that
existed within the RSFSR of the former Soviet Union. In fact, the
1993 Constitution embodies the same federal hierarchies as the
previous Soviet (and RSFSR) constitutions. At the end of the So-
viet period, and through four Soviet constitutions, the federal
structure of the USSR remained comprised of fifteen union re-
publics-Soviet Socialist Republics ("SSRs"); twenty autonomous
republics- Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics ("ASSRs");
eight autonomous oblasts; and ten autonomous okrugs.
23
The RSFSR began creating autonomous subdivisions before
the Soviet Union was fully established. These subdivisions were
also based upon the ethnic majority of their populations. For ex-
ample, between 1920 and 1923, the RSFSR established several
autonomous republics and oblasts on its territory.24 Two of these
autonomous regions are now countries or parts of countries: the
Kirghiz ASSR is now Kirghiziya and Crimean ASSR is now part of
Ukraine. Additionally, most of the other regions, which today
enjoy republican status, were designated as autonomous oblasts.
These include Chuvashiya, Mari(-el), Komi, (Mongol-) Buryatiya,
and Kabardino-Balkariya.
25
22. Throughout the life of the Soviet Union, the transformation of regions from des-
ignation to designation took place quite a few times. For instance, in 1925, the Chuvash
Autonomous Area became an autonomous republic, and in 1930, the Mordov National
Area was transformed into an autonomous region, then in 1936 into an autonomous re-
public. See Marat Salikov, Russian and American Federation: Comparative and Legal
Analysis of Their Origins and Developments, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 161, 178
[hereinafter Salikov, Federation]; see also the footnotes on pages 244 to 245 on the depor-
tation and reformation of the national republics of the Chechen and Ingushi peoples, as
well as others.
23. See Nicholas Lynn & Alexei Novikov, REFEDERALIZING RUSSIA: DEBATES ON
THE IDEA OF FEDERALISM IN RUSSIA, 27 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 187, 190 (1997)
[hereinafter Lynn & Novikov, REFEDERALIZING].
24. See NATIONALITIES, supra note 1, at 31-32, 45. It is also interesting to note that
in 1924, the Russian Turkestan ASSR was divided along ethnic lines into what later be-
came the Soviet Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Uzbekhistan, Tadzhikistan, Kir-
ghiziya, and Turkmenistan. See id. at 45.
25. The other autonomous republics and oblasts are: Tatarstan ASSR, Karelia, Vo-
tyak Autonomous Region, Dagestan ASR, Gorskaya ASR, Karachai-Cherkess Autono-
mous Region, Yakut ASSR, Oirot Autonomous Region, Adygei Autonomous Region. i
[Vol. 21:1
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The RSFSR enacted the first Soviet Socialist constitution.26
While this constitution was mostly concerned with giving "all
power to the people," it also recognized the various nationalities
within Post-revolutionary Russia. 27 Article 11 of the 1918 Consti-
tution states:
The soviets of regions with a distinct mode of living and na-
tional composition can unite in autonomous regional unions at
the head of which, as at the head of all regional unions that can
be eventually formed, stand regional congresses of Soviets and
their executive agencies. These autonomous regional unions
form, on a federal basis, component parts of the Russian So-
cialist Federative Soviet Republic.
28
The 1918 Constitution incorporated the general principle of
federalism,29 but did little to establish the substantive relationship
between the federal government and individual regions. 30 In fact,
"the terms autonomous oblasts,31 [autonomous] republics and So-
viet republics were used interchangeably." 32 In establishing sepa-
rate regions for the different nationalities, the Russian government
found it necessary and useful to differentiate among the national
(non-Russian) areas. This was accomplished by determining
whether the national areas were located on a border of the coun-
try.33 Areas located on the periphery were designated Union Re-
26. See KONST. USSR (1918) (Aug. 31, 1998)
<http://www.bucknell.edu/departments/russian/const/18consOl.html> [hereinafter KONST.
USSR (1918)]. The Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, ap-
proved by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets in January 1918, together with the
constitution of the Soviet Republic approved by the Fifth Congress, make up the single
fundamental law of the RSFSR. See Salikov, Federation, supra note 22, at 171.
27. See KONST. USSR (1918) art. 22. The Constitution of'the RSFSR specifically
provides that "any oppression of national minorities or restriction of their equality [are]
contraventions of the fundamental laws of the Republic."
28. See id art 11.
29. The Second Congress of the Cominternin in 1920 adopted Lenin's view that "fed-
eralism is a transitional form to complete the union of the toilers of different nations." See
NATIONALITIES, supra note 1, at 26.
30. The Resolution on the Federal Institutions of the Russian Republic was enacted
by the Third Soviet Congress before the adoption of the 1918 constitution, on January
1918, but it also did nothing to clarify the federal situation. This Act did, though, deter-
mine the system of highest federal bodies. See Salikov, Federation, supra note 22, at 176.
31. The autonomous area (okrug) of later constitutions was referred to as a national
area in this version. See id. at 177.
32. See NATIONALITIES, supra note 1, at 29.
33. See id. at 35.
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publics.34 Areas located completely within the boundaries of the
RSFSR were declared autonomous republics, oblasts or okrugs.35
The basis for this classification was that the 1918 Constitution al-
lowed secession to Union Republics, but not to autonomous re-
publics or other political subdivisions. Allowing for possible seces-
sion where the seceding sovereign nation would be completely
surrounded by the RSFSR was considered imprudent.
36
In 1936, the Soviet Union adopted a new constitution.37 This
constitution set forth the federal structure of the Soviet Union in
great detail. The Union (Soviet Socialist) Republics38 made up the
first level. These Republics exercised independent authority, lim-
ited only by the 1936 Constitution's reservation of certain powers
and authority to the federal government.
39
The second level, consists of the Soviet Socialist Republics
contained krais, oblasts, Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics
(ASSR)4° and National Areas.41 These second level entities were
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.; see also KONST. USSR (1977)
<http://www.bucknell.edu/departmentsrussian/const/77consOl.html> [hereinafter KONST.
USSR (1977)].
37. See KONST. USSR (1936)
<http://www.bucknell.edu/departments/russian/const/36consOl.html> [hereinafter KONST.
USSR (1936)]. As a member of the Soviet Union, Russia adopted constitutions in 1925,
1937, and 1978, all of which corresponded to and were adopted one year later than the
corresponding (Soviet) Union Constitution. See Salikov, Federation, supra note 22, at 177;
see also AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 49. To simplify the descrip-
tion, I will describe only the Soviet Constitution of a given year.
38. The Soviet Socialist Republics in 1936 were: The Russian Soviet Federated So-
cialist Republic, The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, The Byelorussian Soviet Social-
ist Republic, The Azerbaidjan Soviet Socialist Republic, The Georgian Soviet Socialist
Republic, The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic, The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, The Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic, The Ka-
zakh Soviet Socialist Republic, The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic, The Karelo-Finnish
Soviet Socialist Republic, The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, The Lithuanian Soviet
Socialist Republic, The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, and The Estonian Soviet So-
cialist Republic. See KONST. USSR (1936) art. 13. With the exception of the Karelo-
Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic, these republics became sovereign states upon the break-
up of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic was eventu-
ally downgraded to one of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics within the RSFSR.
See KONST. USSR (1977) art. 85. The reasons may have been the Republic's location on
the Finnish border and the fact that both the 1936 and 1977 Constitutions allowed a Union
Republic, but not an ASSR, to freely secede from the Soviet Union.
39. See KONST. USSR (1936) arts. 14-15.
40. This region is basically equivalent to a republic in present-day Russia.
41. See KONST. USSR (1936) arts. 22-29.
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not considered subdivisions of the Union (Soviet Socialist) Re-
publics, but rather as subjects of the federal government, albeit
lesser subjects.
42
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet Union's parlia-
ment, had two chambers.43 The lower chamber was the Soviet of
the Union. Soviet citizens throughout the country elected its
deputies.44 The upper chamber was the Soviet of Nationalities.
Recognized bodies of the federal structure elected its deputies. 45
Each Soviet Socialist Republics elected twenty-five deputies to this
chamber, while the Autonomous Republics elected eleven depu-
ties. The Autonomous oblasts elected twenty-five deputies, and
National Areas elected one deputy.46
Not only did the 1936 Constitution detail the government
structure for the Soviet Union as a whole,47 it also detailed the
structure for the Union Soviet Socialist Republics,48 the Autono-
mous Soviet Socialist Republics,49 and the local governments, in-
cluding krais, oblasts, and okrugs.50 The interaction between all of
these federal divisions, however, did not extensively develop until
the adoption of the 1977 Constitution. Nonetheless, the evolution
and development of this federal structure was theoretically signifi-
cant; the power always flowed from the center of the Soviet Union
and constitutional delineations of authority and jurisdiction were
observed only in the broadest sense.
On October 7, 1977, the Seventh (Special) Session of the Su-
preme Soviet of the USSR affirmed "the ideas and principles of
the first Soviet Constitution of 1918, the 1924 Constitution of the
U.S.S.R.,51 and the 1936 Constitution of the U.S.S.R." by adopting
42. See id art. 35. The Russian Constitution of 1937 recognized autonomous repub-
lics and autonomous regions as members of its Federation. The autonomous regions had
been within the structure of the territories that were not subjects of the Union. See
Salikov, Federation, supra note 22, at 178.
43. See KONST. USSR (1936) art. 33.
44. See id. art. 34.
45. See id. art. 35. This chamber is analogous to Russia's present day upper chamber,
the Federation Council.
46. See id.
47. See id. ch. V.
48. See id. ch. VI.
49. See id. ch. VII.
50. See id ch. VIII.
51. The 1924 Constitution was closely modeled after -the 1918 RSFSR constitution,
but went beyond the point of being a Russian constitution and became a constitution of
the Soviet Union. See NATIONALITIES, supra note 1, at 43.
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an amended and revised constitution. 52 The federal structure of
the 1977 Constitution is strikingly similar to the structure of the
1936 Constitution, but more complete. Under the new constitu-
tion, the Union Republics increased their influence in the Soviet of
Nationalities by electing thirty-two deputies each.53 The autono-
mous oblasts and autonomous okrugs became constituent parts of
the Union Republic within which they were located.54 Their laws,
however, were given force only if the Supreme Soviet of the Union
Republic adopted them.55 Autonomous Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, gaining a clear definition of their autonomy, increased the
preferential treatment they received with respect to the secondary
federal subjects within the Soviet Union's federal structure.56
B. The Birth of the Power-Sharing Treaty
Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union dur-
ing the March of 1985.57 By the end of 1991, however, the Soviet
Union no longer existed and Russia had declared itself a sovereign
nation.58 Gorbachev resigned in 1991, and was replaced by Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin. The Russian government wasted no time try-
ing to establish a constitutional structure. In 1990, the Russian
Congress established a Constitutional Commission, which pro-
duced constitutional drafts in November 1990, October 1991, and
February 1992.59 President Yeltsin, however, did not like the
Congressional Commission's drafts so he commissioned his own
52. See KONST. USSR (1977) art. 85.
53. See id. art. 110. The deputies elected from the other regions remained the same:
Autonomous Republics-eleven, Autonomous Oblasts-five, and Autonomous Okrugs-one.
54. See id. arts. 82-88. Under the first edition of the 1978 (RSFSR) Constitution the
autonomous areas were recognized as Federation members. By that time, there were six-
teen autonomous republics, five autonomous regions, and ten autonomous areas in the
Russian Federation structure. See Salikov, Federation, supra note 22, at 178.
55. See KONST. USSR (1977), supra note 36, art. 86.
56. See id. arts. 82-83.
57. Leonid Brezhnev was General Secretary of the U.S.S.R. until 1982. Andropov
served from 1982-84. Chernenko served until his death in early 1985. He was replaced by
Mikhail Gorbachev. See AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 17-18.
58. Mikhail Gorbachev resigned from the Presidency of the U.S.S.R. on December
25, 1991. See id. at 17.
59. See id. at 49-52. The Constitutional Commission was chaired by Parliament
Chairman, Boris Yeltsin. He was an infrequent visitor to the Commission, however.
Robert Sharlet, Transitional Constitutionalism: Politics and Law in the Second Russian
Republic, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 495, 496 (Summer 1996) [hereinafter Sharlet, Transitional].
See also Sharlet, Prospects, supra note 20, at 118.
[Vol. 21:1
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draft of the Constitution.60 By June of 1993, President Yeltsin de-
cided to proceed with his version. President Yeltsin established a
Constitutional Conference to bring together people from all over
the country to discuss and amend the proposed constitution.
61
Once the Constitution passed through the Constitutional
Conference, President Yeltsin realized that he faced difficulties in
adopting the new constitution. Because he had earlier spurned the
congressional draft of the constitution, he initially dismissed the
idea of adopting the constitution by congressional vote. On the
other hand, adopting the Constitution by vote of the Constitu-
tional Conference or Presidential decree lacked sufficient demo-
cratic legitimacy.
62
Yeltsin eventually decided to present the constitution to each
of the eighty-nine republics of the Federation. Support from two-
thirds of the regions was required to adopt the draft.63 It soon be-
came apparent, however, that the President would be unable to get
two-thirds of the subjects to approve the proposed constitution.
Consequently, Yeltsin thought that if the upper house of Russia's
Parliament, which included deputies from all of the subjects of the
Federation, approved the constitution, this would lend the same
legitimacy as approval by the subjects themselves.64 The upper
house, nevertheless, declined to consider the matter.65
The last route of legitimate adoption was to obtain the ap-
proval of the people of Russia. While the outcome remained un-
certain, President Yeltsin decided to put the adoption of the pro-
posed constitution to a referendum.66 The referendum took place
on December 12, 1993, along with elections to the State Duma67
and the Federation Council.68 Fifty-eight percent of the people
approved the Constitution.69 Thus on December 25, 1993, two
60. See AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 53.
61. See id. at 56-57.
62. See id at 63.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 64.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 72.
67. The Duma, Russia's first elected Parliamentary Body, was originally created in
the Russian Constitution of 1906. See id. at 14.
68. See id.
69. The First Russian Republic is considered to have begun upon the declaration of
sovereignty by Russia in 1990 and ended on October 4, 1993 with President Yeltsin's mili-
tary assault on Parliament. See Sharlet, Prospects, supra note 20, at 115.
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years to the day after the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev, the
second Russian Republic was born.70 Despite (or perhaps because
of) the efforts and machinations of President Yeltsin, the legiti-
macy of the 1993 Constitution was challenged. First, previous ref-
erendums required support by a majority of voters in a majority of
subjects, as well as a majority of the total popular vote for ap-
proval. Yeltsin, on the other hand, required only a majority of the
total vote.71 Second, accusations surfaced that the referendum was
fraudulently tallied and that some ballots throughout the country
were falsified.72 Finally, the Electoral Commission and President
Yeltsin were suspected of using incorrect base numbers of the total
electorate in determining the percentage of electoral participation
in the referendum.
73
In order for the referendum to be considered legitimate, at
least fifty percent of the total electorate must participate. Officials
calculated that fifty-five percent of the electorate participated in
the referendum. Some critics of the referendum, however, allege
that total electoral participation may have been as low as forty-six
percent and that errors, or even fraud, by the Electoral Commis-
sion resulted in an over-inflated estimation of electoral participa-
tion.7
4
Yeltsin's methods, though less than forthright and demo-
cratic, may be justified. As the former republics of the Soviet
Union were declaring sovereignty from the Soviet Union, a com-
parable situation was occurring in Russia on a smaller scale.75
Many of the previously autonomous regions within Russia de-
clared or threatened to declare their outright independence from
70. See AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 76-78. Implementation of
activities under the Constitution began with the convening of the new Federal Assembly
in January 1994, as constitutionally required on the thirtieth day following its election (art
99). See Sharlet, Transitional, supra note 59, at 506. The Constitution entered into force
on the day the official results of the referendum were published (12/25/93).
71. See AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 65.
72. See id. at 73-74.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. "The rising regional nationalism which followed the dismantling of the Soviet
Union in 1991 increased the already broadening divisions within Russia. This phenome-
non creates further concern that the newly independent states would disintegrate due to
resurgent ethnic and political tension." Elliot Stanton Berke, The Chechnya Inquiry:




the Russian Federation.76 Russia would have suffered a fate simi-
lar to that of the former Soviet Union had the central authorities
not taken extraordinary steps to prevent it. In addition, allega-
tions that President Yeltsin obliterated the old, Soviet-era Russian
Constitution and laws can be countered with the argument that it
was not possible to replace the old system any other way.
The signing of the Federation Treaty on March 13, 1992, was
one of the first steps toward adopting the 1993 Constitution.77 Be-
fore Yeltsin modified the draft constitution, this Treaty was ap-
pended to the 1993 Constitution as Part II. It also confirmed and
consolidated the special status of the republics within the federal
structure.78 In fact, the provisions from the Federation Treaty
served as a starting point for the early Power-Sharing Treaties, in-
cluding Tatarstan's treaty. The Federation Treaty gave the Re-
publics greater political and economic rights over other subjects of
the Federation. 79
This began a battle between the subjects that Yeltsin thought
he ended when he equalized the subject's status in the 1993 Consti-
tution.80 While Republics still had the right to a republican flag, a
constitution, and their own language, the adopted version of the
1993 Constitution excludes the Federation Treaty.81 Where the
treaty and Constitution overlapped, the Constitution trumped.82
76. After cracking down on the regional legislatures, Moscow realized the need for a
revised constitution. On December 12, 1993, the current Constitution of Russia was ap-
proved by national referendum. See id. at 898.
77. RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS: LEGAL MATERIALS (John Hazard & Vratislave
Pechota eds., 1997). The Federation Treaty was one of a series of treaties signed with the
ethnic republics (except Tatarstan and Chechnya), the oblasts and krais and the federal
cities of the Russian Federation. See Sharlet, Prospects, supra note 20, at 119; see also
Salikov, Federation, supra note 22, at 179. Chechnya and Tatarstan, both predominately
Islamic republics, refused to sign the 1992 Treaty and declared independence. See Berke,
Chechnya, supra note 75, at 898.
78. See Sharlet, Prospects, supra note 20, at 119; see also AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 134.
79. See Sharlet, Prospects, supra note 20, at 119. The 1992 Federation Treaty, at-
tempting to subdue such tension, did much to advance the Russian constitutional cause.
The Treaty attempted to mend the rift by defining the division of powers and relations be-
tween the center and the regions; see also Berke, Chechnya, supra note 75, at 897.
80. The 1993 constitution declares that all subjects of the Russian Federation, in rela-
tion to the federal bodies of state power, are legally equal among themselves. See KONST.
RF (1993) art. 5(4).
81. See Sharlet, Prospects, supra note 20, at 123.
82 See id
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On February 15, 1994, the Russian Federation finalized its
first Power-Sharing Treaty with one of its subjects, Tatarstan.
83
Government officials interpreted Tartarstan's refusal to sign the
Federation Treaty as the key to halting the early secessionist
movement. The officials, therefore, felt it necessary to accede to
some of the republic's demands to keep the Federation together.
This encouraged other regions to seek similar accommodations
from the central government.
Throughout 1994 and 1995, six more republics negotiated and
signed Power-Sharing Treaties with Moscow. 84 The krais, oblasts
and okrugs began negotiating their own agreements with the gov-
ernment once they discovered the extra consideration that the re-
publics were receiving because of their Power-Sharing Treaties.85
Under the aegis of a Presidential Commission that is specifically
responsible for the negotiation of the Power-Sharing Treaties, this
process has continued. 86 There are currently forty-six Power-
Sharing Treaties in force. 87
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENTS
The principal goal (of the Federation) must be the dividing of
power between the center and regions... [but it seems the] frag-
ile veneer of unity is being strained by... [the regions'] demands
to chart their own political course, mine their own riches, spend
83. See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 247.
84. Kabardino-Balkar, Bashkortostan, Northern Ossetia-Alaniya, Sakha (Yakutiya),
Buryatiya, and Udmurt republics. See id at 854.
85. Vasily Kononenko, Eduard Rossel Materializes At Last His Idea Of Partial Sover-
eignty Of Sverdlovsk Region, RUSSIAN PRESS DIG., Jan. 13, 1996. The first Power-Sharing
Treaty signed between Moscow and a Russian Federation subject other than a republic
was on January 12, 1996, with Sverdlovsk and Kaliningrad Oblasts. It was reported at the
time that "Boris Yeltsin hailed the treaties, saying that this practice only strengthens Rus-
sian federalism and will be continued." Id.
86. See AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 136. Yeltsin sought to en-
sure the process will continue even when he has gone. At the signing of the Power-
Sharing Treaty with Krasnoyarsk krai, Yeltsin brought Boris Nemtsov, deputy Prime
Minister and a leading reformer from Nizhny Novgorod, and anointed him "guarantor of
the accords." Sebastian Smith, Role of Yeltsin's heir apparent grows for Nemtsov,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 2,1997.
87. Yeltsin Signs More Power-Sharing Treaties, 3 IEWS RUSSIAN REGIONAL
REPORT 4; Federal Government Signs Power-Sharing Treaty with Moscow, 3 IEWS
RUSSIAN REGIONAL REPORT 4. On May 21, 1998, the central government signed five
more agreements (the texts of which were not immediately available) with the Republic of
Mari-El, and Kostromo, Ivanovo, Voronezh and Amur oblasts. On June 16, 1998, a
Power-Sharing Treaty was signed with (the federal city) Moscow. See id.
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Power Sharing Treaties
their own money and define their own values. - Valery Sham-
shurov, Deputy Minister in Russia's Ministry of Nationalities
Affairs and Regional Policy.
88
In the past four and a half years, the Power-Sharing Treaties
between the Russian Federation and its various subjects have un-
dergone an evolution. The treaties were first used in 1994 as a
bridge to stabilize the federal structure. Now, the current treaties
greatly resemble the earliest treaties. Nonetheless, there is a
marked change from the very first treaties signed, i.e., with Tatar-
stan, Bashkortostan and Northern Ossetia, to the treaties signed
with most of the regions since then.
For example, Russia developed a "model" language for many
of the necessary provisions. This evolution is the result of changed
circumstances. The first treaties were signed to forestall the
growing desire for independence. In contrast, current treaties fo-
cus on positive relations between the center and the regions.
The following section analyzes the provisions of a model
Power-Sharing Treaty.89 This section is divided into five parts.
First, it examines the presidential decrees, which implemented the
Commission on the Power-Sharing Treaty process. Second, it
compares nearly all of the Treaty provisions to treaties signed
during various points in the treaty-signing process. Third, it dis-
cusses the key provisions of the Treaties, especially those that sig-
nificantly interact with the Constitution. Fourth, it looks at the
Supplemental Agreements signed alongside the Power-Sharing
Treaties. Finally, it examines the federal law that represents the
culmination of this process and, possibly, its downfall.
A. Pre-Agreement Legislation
Just a few months after the central government successfully
negotiated its first Power-Sharing Treaty with Tatarstan, President
Yeltsin realized that this treaty-signing process might continue for
a long time. To this end, he established a Commission to oversee
the treaty preparation and to "implement a constitutional founda-
8& See Berke, Chechnya, supra note 75, at 903.
89. The texts of most of the Power-Sharing Treaties are available in one of two
places. All of the treaties signed up to June 1997 are included in the work Federalizm
Vlasti i Vlast' Federalizma (Mikhail H. Guboglo et al. eds., 1997). See generally Federal-
izm, supra note 11. Many of these same treaties are also available at
http://www.region.rags.ru.
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tion of the federal structure of the Russian Federation" and to en-
sure "cooperation and coordination in the preparation of the trea-
ties"9
0
Although the Commission performs "preliminary examina-
tion of the questions relating to the delimitation of jurisdiction, '"
91
its main tasks involve consultation after the treaty is signed. 92 In
March, 1996, a presidential decree established new regulations. 93
These regulations evenly distributed the main tasks of the Com-
mission between pre-treaty preparations and post-treaty imple-
mentation.
94
B. The Similar Provisions
While the "Party of Power" 95 never published a "model
treaty," all treaties share common provisions. For example, the
first article in each of the Power-Sharing Treaties almost always
seeks to establish the boundaries of the treaty. The most common
language states: "This treaty delimits the jurisdiction and powers
between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and or-
gans of state power of [the region]."'96
90. See id. at 236.
91. Regulations of the Commission under the auspices of the President of the Russian
Federation on Preparation of the Treaties on Delimitation of Jurisdiction and Powers be-
tween the Federal Organs of State Power and the Organs of State Power of the Subjects of
the Russian Federation, para. 1. See id. at 237.
92. Id.
93. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Confirmation of the
Regulations on the Order of Work in Delimitation of Jurisdiction and Powers between the
Federal Organs of State Power and the Organs of State Power of the Subjects of the Rus-
sian Federation and on Joint Transfer of Implementation of Part of its Powers by the Fed-
eral Organs of Executive Power and the Organs of Executive Power of the Subjects of the
Russian Federation. See id at 239.
94. Regulations on the Order of Work in Delimitation of Jurisdiction and Powers be-
tween the Federal Organs of State Power and the Organs of State Power of the Subjects of
the Russian Federation and on Joint Transfer of Implementation of Part of its Powers by
the Federal Organs of Executive Power and the Organs of Executive Power of the Sub-
jects of the Russian Federation. See id at 240.
95. The media in Russia has begun to call Yeltsin's administration, the "Party of
Power." This stems in part from the fact that President Yeltsin has tried to remain above
the fray by staying out of party politics. Many commentators think that President Yeltsin
made a huge mistake by not building a party of reformers around himself which could
have continued democratic reforms after he is gone. See Robert W. Orttung, Russia's
"Party Of Power" Troubled by Regional Election Results (Analytical Brief #442), Open
Media Research Institute <http://www.iews.org>.
96. See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 287.
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Some of the agreements make reference to the fact that this
delimitation is made in accordance with both the Russian and the
republican constitutions. 97 Other agreements, much like the 10th
Amendment of the United States' Constitution, go so far as to re-
serve the "fullness of state power" for subjects in all areas "outside
the limits of the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation," both in its
sole capacity and in the areas of joint jurisdiction with the sub-
jects.9
8
From the perspective of the federal government, one of the
most important issues in the Power-Sharing Treaties is the su-
premacy of federal law over regional law. In fact, Article 4 of the
Constitution provides: "The Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion and federal laws shall have supremacy throughout the entire
territory of the Russian Federation."99 Consequently, the treaties
provide for supremacy of federal legislation, leaving the subject
free to regulate any areas not covered by federal jurisdiction. The
most common provision in these treaties has three components:
(1) Absent federal legislation in areas of joint jurisdiction, the
subject may legislate freely (implicitly leaving solely federal and
solely regional jurisdiction to their respective "organs of state
power."); (2) After the center has legislated in an area of joint ju-
risdiction, the region may regulate that area only in accordance
with federal law; and (3) Any laws not in accordance with federal
law are automatically considered inapplicable, or void.100
Another important provision of the Power-Sharing Treaties
allows federal legislation to supersede the treaty under certain cir-
cumstances. If the federal legislation applies to all subjects of the
Federation and gives greater powers or privileges to the subjects
than those given in the treaty, then the federal legislation ap-
plies. 1°1 On the other hand, if the federal executive branch unilat-
erally adopts rules or regulations that contradict the treaty, then
97. See id. at 247.
98. See id. at 260.
99. KONST. RF (1993) art. 4(2).
100. See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 338. The regions with this type of provision in-
clude: Republics: Buryatiya, Chuvashiya, Komi, Udmurt; Oblasts: Ulyanovsk, Sakhalin,
Perm, Omsk, Irkutsk, Sverdlovsk, Tver; and Krasnodar krai. The early versions of this
provision, in treaties with Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Northern Ossetia simply stated:
"Organs of state power of the Russian Federation, just as the organs of power of the Re-
public of Tatarstan, may not introduce legislative acts on questions not relating to its
authority." See id
101. See id. at 376.
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the treaty remains supreme. 10 2 Finally, if the subject adopts legis-
lation that contradicts the treaty, the treaty, and not the legislation,
shall apply.
10 3
Many of the later treaties contain a provision regarding the
subject's right to establish "international and foreign economic
ties." 10 4 The main point in this provision is that the subject may
act independently in pursuing international and foreign economic
ties (with foreign governments) unless doing so contradicts the
Constitution of the Russian Federation, the federal law or the in-
ternational treaties of the Russian Federation. 10 5 Most important
for the federal government, however, is that the "organs of state
power of the Russian Federation, in accordance with federal law,"
shall coordinate the international and foreign economic ties" of
the region in question.10 6 This area is within the joint jurisdiction
of the central and regional governments and is a fact that is exam-
ined in more detail in supplemental agreements with many re-
gions.107
Another consistent provision in Power-Sharing Treaties con-
cerns regional government reactions to legal acts of federal execu-
tive power outside its jurisdiction. The first part of this provision
allows the subject to bring an action in a federal court to invalidate
these legal acts. The regional organs of state power can bring suit
against legal acts of the federal executive branch which: (1) regu-
late questions within the jurisdiction of the region; (2) do not cor-
respond to the executive branch's powers within the area of joint
jurisdiction; or (3) unilaterally redistribute powers set forth in the
Constitution or the Power-Sharing Treaty.10
8
The second part of this provision allows the regional govern-
ment to make "recommendations" to the federal government re-
garding the repeal or suspension of legal acts that affect the re-
gion.10 9 Furthermore, some of the treaties expand this provision
to allow the federal government to repeal or suspend the activity
in question one month after submitting the "recommendation." If
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See RUSSIA & THE REPUBLICS: LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 77, at 1.
105. See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 381.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 206-10.




the federal government does not act on the "recommendation" af-
ter one month, the legal acts in question will not apply to the re-
gional organs of state power until the appropriate court has ren-
dered a decision in the matter.
110
Some of the early Treaties included a provision concerning
juridical documents, but it has since fallen into disuse. This provi-
sion acknowledges regional autonomy by providing that "juridical
documents, issued by organs of power ... of the Russian Federa-
tion and [the region], within the limits of the powers of these or-
gans... shall have force on the territory of [the region] and all of
the Russian Federation." 111 Although this provision was probably
important early in the Power-Sharing Treaty process because of
the uncertain governmental structure of the time, this provision
most likely fell out of use when the governmental structure be-
came more stabilized.
Dispute resolution is one of the most important points in the
Power-Sharing Treaties. Typically, the central government and
the region will not definitively decide this point in the Treaty itself,
but will instead leave it for future agreement. Normally, a provi-
sion will state the following: "Arguments and disagreements aris-
ing in the course of the realization of this Treaty, and also argu-
ments about competence between organs of state power of the
Russian Federation and organs of state power of [the region] in
areas of joint jurisdiction shall be settled according to agreed pro-
cedures . "..."112 Some provisions also additionally state the fol-
lowing: "or in a manner established by the Constitution of the
Russian Federation and legislation of the Russian Federation," to
ensure that disputes between the federal government and the re-
gions are resolved within the constitutional system of the courts. 113
Earlier treaties were more limited in their coverage of dispute
resolution. The Agreements with Tatarstan, Northern Ossetia and
Bashkortostan only covered disputes arising in the areas of joint
jurisdiction. 114 For example, Tatarstan's provision simply states:
"Arguments on implementation of powers in the sphere of joint
jurisdiction of organs of state power of the Russian Federation and
of organs of state power of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be re-
110. See id. at 348.
111. See id. at 251.
112. Id. at 341.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 252.
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solved in a manner agreed upon by them."" 5 Most of the later
provisions in this area are broader in scope, and cover disagree-
ments not only in the "sphere of joint jurisdiction," but also in the
"realization of... [the] treaty" in general." 6
Many of the dispute resolution provisions of the Power-
Sharing Treaties include an important connection to the Constitu-
tion. These provisions allow dispute resolution by "the Constitu-
tional Court of the Russian Federation in accordance with parts
two and three of article 125 of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, and also the Supreme Court of the Russian Federa-
tion, and the High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation
according to their competencies.""1
7
Article 125 of the 1993 Constitution defines the Constitu-
tional Court's role within the Russian Federation." 8 Part two of
Article 125 allows certain bodies within the hierarchy of the fed-
eral and regional governments, including "bodies of legislative and
executive power of the subjects," to ask the Constitutional Court
to decide the constitutionality of a point of contention." 9 The
points of contention may come from "agreements between organs
of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state
power of subjects of the Russian Federation."1 20 Part three of Ar-
ticle 125 allows the Constitutional Court to resolve disputes over
jurisdiction between, inter alia, "state organs of the Russian Fed-
eration and state organs of the subjects .... "121
Another Power-Sharing Treaty provision related to the fore-
going allows the laws of the regional government to have "state
protection.' ' 122 In other words, regional laws and "other norma-
tive acts" can be enforced within the court system of the Russian
115. See id
116. Generally, the earlier treaties (with Tatarstan, Udmurtiya, Bashkortostan, North-
ern Ossetia and Chuvashiya) address only joint jurisdiction in this provision, while later
treaties treat this idea more broadly, including the treaties with Sverdlovsk, Perm, Kras-
nodarsk, Komi Republic, Buryat Republic, Irkutsk, Omsk, Tver, and Sakhalin.
117. Federalizm, supra note 11, at 414.
118. See KONST. RF (1993), art. 125. Article 126 addresses the Supreme Court and
Article 127 addresses the Supreme (High) Arbitration Court. See KONST. RE (1993), arts.
125-26.
119. See KONST. RF (1993), art. 125(2).
120. Id. art. 125(2)(c).
121. KONST. RF (1993), art. 125(3)(b).
122- See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 325. "Laws and other normative acts of Omsk
oblast are subject to state protection and are subject to the courts in accordance with their




To enhance the cooperation between the central government
and the regional governments, the Constitution provides that fed-
eral organs of executive power may delegate their powers to the
executive power of the regions, with the agreement of the latter. 124
Similarly, the subjects may also delegate to the federal govern-
ment, if both agree. 125 Using language nearly identical to that in
the Constitution, the Power-Sharing Treaties include these same
ideas, allowing: "Transfer by federal bodies of executive power of
implementation of a part of its powers to bodies of executive
power of [the region], in accordance with article 78 of the Consti-
tution of the Russian Federation,... unless the Constitution of the
Russian Federation or federal law directly prohibits the transfer..
• .- 126 A supplemental agreement would carry out the "necessary
conditions" for transferring power from the federal to the regional
level, or vice versa.127
Another article in many of the Power-Sharing Treaties con-
cerns the regions' desire to keep control of solely regional prop-
erty. The regions regulate any control, use or disposal of regional
governmental property in accordance with federal law.128 The re-
gional government will also independently assign control of re-
gional governmental property to its own "organs of state
power."'129 This provision is critical to the regions' desire to con-
trol the enormous mineral wealth of Russia. In the end, definite
resolution of the question of natural resources, however, has been
left for future agreement. 130
Taxation is another area covered by some Power-Sharing
Treaties. This is critical to both the regions and the federal gov-
ernment. The resolution of most of this question is left up to fu-
123. See id at 325.
124. See KONST. RF (1993), art. 78(2).
125. See id. art. 7(3).
126. Federalizm, supra note 11, at 345. Another version states: "Organs of executive
power of [the region] may be endowed by powers of territorial subdivisions of federal or-
gans of executive power by agreement, concluded by the administration [of the region]
with the government of the Russian Federation or federal organs of executive power em-
powered by it." Id
127. See id.
128. See id. at 326. "Questions of control, use, disposal of objects related to govern-
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ture agreement.' 3' A provision in this area provides that the re-
gion will "independently determine and introduce .. .[regional]
taxes ...in accordance with general principles of taxation and
collection, as established by the Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion and federal law [emphasis added]."'1 32 This provision also al-
lows for the establishment of "territorial bodies of the federal
treasury" in the region, although details are left for future agree-
ment.13
3
Finally, every treaty signed includes minor provisions, which
do not add much substantively to the negotiated subject matter,
but are nevertheless critical to the proper procedural implementa-
tion of the treaty. Most of the Agreements include minor provi-
sions on subjects such as the creation of commissions, 34 empow-
ered representatives in Moscow and the regional capital, 135
changes or additions to the treaty,136 and entry into force of the
treaty. 1
37
C. The Key Provisions - Delimiting Jurisdiction
Each of the Power-Sharing Treaties includes vital sections
delineating the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, the jurisdic-
tion of the region and the joint jurisdiction to be shared between
the central government and the subject. Not coincidentally, the
131. See id. at 400. "The makeup and amount of income of credits from federal taxes
to the budget of Saratov oblast, shall be determined by agreement of Russian Federation
and Saratovoblast, unless directly provided for in federal law." Id
132. Id
133. See id at 380.
134. See id. at 414. "With the goal of effective realization of this Treaty, the organs of
state power of the Russian Federation and the organs of state power of Bryansk oblast
may create joint commissions and other working bodies on equal footing." Idt
135. See id. at 387. "Organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of
state power of Vologda oblast may have their own representatives respectively in the city
of Vologda and in Moscow." It
136. See id at 408. "Additions and changes shall be introduced into this treaty by mu-
tual agreement of the sides by way of additions to this treaty or the conclusion of a new
treaty. This Treaty or separate provisions may not be abrogated, changed or supple-
mented unilaterally, unless otherwise provided for by federal law." lIt
137. See idt at 394.
This treaty is subject to publication in official edition and enters into force from
the moment of publication. From the moment of entry into force of this treaty
earlier concluded treaties and agreements between the organs of state power of
the Russian Federation and organs of state power of Chelyabinsk oblast shall
operate in part to the extent that they do not contradict this treaty.
Power Sharing Treaties
Constitution also includes articles that list the areas of federal ju-
risdiction and the areas of joint jurisdiction. 138 Moreover, the
Constitution also provides: "Outside of the jurisdiction of the
Russian Federation and the powers of the Russian Federation on
issues within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and
the subjects of the Russian Federation, the subjects of the Russian
Federation shall exercise the entire spectrum of state power."' 139
Delineating the areas of jurisdiction as solely federal, solely
regional or joint is critical for determining how federal and re-
gional laws interact. Article 76 of the Russian Constitution pro-
vides the guidelines for this interaction. 140 If the federal govern-
ment passes a law within an area of its sole jurisdiction, this law
will, much like a regulation in the European Union, have direct ef-
fect throughout the federation. 141 On the other hand, if the law is
passed in an area of joint jurisdiction, the subjects are required to
pass laws in their own territory bringing into effect the federal law,
as with a directive in the European Union. 142 In accordance with
Article 73, the regions pass their own laws in areas of their sole ju-
risdiction.14
3
The laws of a subject may not contravene a federal law, if the
latter was passed in areas of federal or joint jurisdiction as set forth
in Article 78.144 In such a case, the conflict between federal and
regional law is resolved in favor of federal law.145 Appropriately,
in a case where a federal law contradicts a regional law, in an area
of sole regional jurisdiction, the regional law applies.146
1. Federal Jurisdiction
For a federation to succeed in modern-day Russia, the central
government is the most important area of jurisdiction. 147 The
rights and responsibilities of the regions depend on the amount of
power retained by the central government. A federation must be-
138. See KONST. RF (1993) arts. 71-72.
139. See id. art. 73.
140. See id. art. 78.
141. See id. art. 78(1).
142. See id art. 78(2).
143. See id. art. 78(4).
144. See id. art. 78(5).
145. See id.
146. See id art. 78(6).
147. See Peter Krug, Departure from the Centralized ModeL The Russian Supreme
Court and Constitutional Control of Legislation, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 725,726-27 (1997).
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gin with distinct and defined federal powers to enable cohesiveness
between the regions.
In theory, the Russian Constitution provides for this defini-
tion. Article 71 sets forth the areas of sole federal jurisdiction. 148
Article 72 defines the jurisdictional areas that the central and re-
gional governments share. 149 Article 73 states that an area not
covered by either Article 71 or Article 72 falls within Russian Fed-
eration subjects' jurisdiction. 150
Article 71 of the Russian Constitution provides an illustrative
list of 18 areas over which the Russian Federation exerts sole ju-
risdiction. 151 This list encompasses a wide range of topics neces-
sary and appropriate for central control in a federal setting. These
areas include: adoption of the Constitution; definition of the fed-
eral structure; determination of basic federal policy in areas such
as the economy and the environment; establishment of the frame-
work for a single market; issues concerning the federal budget,
taxes, and trade relations; national defense; federal judicial system;
and regulation of intellectual property.152 Not surprisingly, the
Constitution's list of areas of federal jurisdiction is borrowed en-
tirely from the Federation Treaty.153
It is questionable today whether these areas are firmly within
the federal government's sole jurisdiction. Initially, the Power-
Sharing Treaties included a provision that detailed the areas of
sole central government jurisdiction. 154 These provisions were
nearly identical to the list of areas already established in Article 71
of the Constitution. In subsequent agreements, however, the pro-
vision changed. Instead of detailing the areas of central govern-
ment jurisdiction, the Russian Federation's responsibilities to the
region are listed under the respective Power-Sharing Treaty.155
148. See KONST. RF (1993) art. 71; see also GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE
RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 99 (1996).
149. See id. art. 72.
150. See id. art. 73. Article 76(4), read in conjunction with Article 73, allows the sub-
jects to legislate in areas not enumerated in Articles 71 or 72. See Peter Krug, Departure
from the Centralized Model: The Russian Supreme Court and Constitutional Control of
Legislation, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 725,764 (1997).
151. See KONST. RE (1993) art 71(a)-(r).
152. See id.
153. See Sharlet, Prospects, supra note 20, at 119.
154. This version of the provision was included in the first four treaties with Tatarstan,





The later provisions provide that both the federal government
and regional governments will implement all necessary measures
in areas of joint jurisdiction. 156 In addition, the federal govern-
ment is expected to enact all other laws or regulations required by
the Power-Sharing Treaty and participate in the development of
programs for social and economic development of the region.
Unless federal law provides otherwise, both the federal and re-
gional governments select the candidates for heads of territorial
subdivisions located on regional territory. 157 This same provision
in other Power-Sharing Treaties assigned federal responsibility to
such areas as regional programs of national language and culture
and national originality, conversion of defense enterprises, and the
structural rebuilding of the economy.
2. Regional Jurisdiction
The provisions on the jurisdiction of the regions in the Power-
Sharing Treaties mirror the provisions concerning federal jurisdic-
tion. In the early Agreements, the provision on the regional gov-
ernment's jurisdiction included a long list of regionally controlled
areas, similar to that of the federal government's jurisdiction.
158
This list tended to be a miniature version of the federal govern-
ment's authority. For example, where the federal government's
jurisdiction extended to the federal constitution, federal healthcare
programs or nomination of federal judges and prosecutors, the re-
gional government's authority would cover the regional constitu-
tion, regional programs of healthcare or nomination of regional
judges and prosecutors.
Some of the early Power-Sharing Treaties also included the
Article 73 language, giving all power outside of federal and joint
jurisdiction areas to the subjects. 159 Later treaties, however, tend
to assume the existence of Article 73. In these treaties, the sub-
jects' responsibilities again mirror those of the federal provision in
that they require the region to cooperate with the central govern-
ment in implementing the provisions of the Power-Sharing Treaty
156. See id at 297.
157. See idi
158. See id at 254.
159. See id. at 266. "The jurisdiction of the Republic of Northern Ossetia includes...
other jurisdiction, not related to the authority of the Russian Federation and joint author-
ity of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Northern Ossetia." Id.
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in areas of joint jurisdiction. 160 This provision of the subjects' re-
sponsibilities under the Power-Sharing Treaty also included topics
similar to the federal jurisdiction provision. The regional govern-
ment participated in programs for social and economic develop-
ment of the region, support for defense enterprises, and develop-
ment of culture and languages.
161
3. Joint Jurisdiction
Where the federal and regional governments share jurisdic-
tion, the Power-Sharing Treaties include two important provisions.
The first provision lists the areas of joint jurisdiction shared be-
tween the central and regional governments. The second provi-
sion addresses how the powers of joint jurisdiction will be shared
between the executive branches of the federal and regional gov-
ernments.
The list of joint jurisdiction areas underwent an interesting
transformation throughout treaty signing process. Early treaties
primarily reiterated the list of areas of joint jurisdiction that were
already enumerated in article 72 of the Constitution. Later in the
process, however, the regions began to reference and affirm the
existence of the areas of joint jurisdiction as enumerated in the
Constitution and then listed further areas of particular concern to
the individual region. 162 Moreover, the provision has begun to
read like a preamble. It states:
Proceeding from geographic, economic, social, national-cultural
and other peculiarities [of the region], the following issues, be-
yond those established by article 72 of the Constitution of the
Russian Federation, fall within the joint jurisdiction of the or-
gans of state power of the Russian Federation and the organs of
state power [of the region]. 16
3
A more recent version of the provision keeps the preamble and
omits the reference to Article 72. It then adds this final paragraph
after listing the areas of joint jurisdiction:
Further questions of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation
and [the region] may be addressed by supplements to this treaty
or the signing of a new treaty on the delimitation of jurisdiction
160. See id. at 358.
161. See id.




and powers; [when this takes place, though,] there shall be no
withdrawal or revision of the jurisdiction of the Russian Federa-
tion or the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the
subjects, established accordingly by articles 71 and 72 of the
Constitution of the Russian Federation.164
The list of joint jurisdiction areas enumerated in the Federa-
tion Treaty and Constitution were meant to apply to a group of
republics and regions. Therefore, it is natural that the areas are
broad in scope and generally defined. The areas include: ensuring
regional and federal constitutions (or charters) and laws in accor-
dance with one another; protecting the rights and freedoms of
people, citizens and national minorities; ensuring lawfulness (law
and order); addressing general issues of development, education,
science, culture, sport and tourism; social security and health care;
protecting the institutions of family, parenthood and childhood;
controlling the use and disposal of natural resources on the terri-
tory of the region; cooperation and coordination in fighting catas-
trophes, natural disasters and epidemics; and establishing the gen-
eral principles of taxation.16
5
Later Power-Sharing Treaties, on the other hand, focused on
economic development or specific concerns of the region in ques-
tion. Examples of these include: provisions aimed at structural
rebuilding of the economy of the region; functionality of the
fuel/energy (or defense) complex of the region; the creation of a
free economic zone on the territory of the region; the cultivation
and realization of federal special purpose programs of social-
economic development of the region; inter-budgetary relations be-
tween the central government and the region; questions of the pro-
tection of military personnel and resettlement of those leaving
military service; and questions of migration of population onto the
territory of region.166
Most of the time, the specific concerns of the regions relate to
problems with the transition from communism to capitalism, or are
environmental or geographic in nature. Some regions are con-
cerned about the effect of destruction of nuclear or chemical war-
heads.1 67 The Republics of Buryatiya and Irkutsk oblast, on the
164. See id at 382.
165. See KONST. RF (1993), art 72; Federalizm, supra note 11, at 255.
166. See id. at 329, 336, 342, 356.
167. See id at 280.
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other hand, are concerned about the environmental degradation of
Lake Baikal, on which they border. 168 The Republic of Northern
Ossetia is seeking to work with the central government on the
border situation with Georgia and Southern Ossetia.169
The second provision concerns the areas of joint jurisdiction
that are included in every Power-Sharing Treaty, with the excep-
tion of three of the earliest: Northern Ossetia, Bashkortostan and
Tatarstan.170 This provision states:
The power of organs of executive power of the Russian Federa-
tion and organs of executive power of [the region] on concrete
issues of joint jurisdiction, established by article 72 of the Con-
stitution of the Russian Federation and listed in... this Treaty,
shall be determined by corresponding agreements, unless oth-
erwise established by federal law.
171
Furthermore, the supplemental agreements are treated as
"indivisible components" of the Power-Sharing Treaty and may be
signed simultaneously with the signing (by the Federation's Repre-
sentative and the region's administrative head) of the Power-
Sharing Treaty, and also at any time after its entry into force. 172
D. The Supplemental Agreements
From the federal government's perspective, it was important
for Power-Sharing Treaties to provide for the regions' acquies-
cence to the federal structure as embodied by the 1993 Constitu-
tion. Inevitably, it was necessary to have separate negotiations on
particularly difficult points. This kept the Power-Sharing Treaty
from being too large and unwieldy, and allowed present and future
topics of negotiation to be conducted within the Power-Sharing
Treaty framework. Therefore, most of the Treaties state that the
Power-Sharing Treaty and future agreements will cover certain ar-
eas.
16& See id. at 277, 329.
169. See id. at 266.
170. Even Tatarstan's Agreement includes a provision which allows supplemental
agreements to be signed after the entry into force of the initial Power-Sharing Treaty.
Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan" "On Delimitation of
Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority Between the State Bodies of the
Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic Tatarstan", (visited Nov. 3, 1998)
<http://www.tatar.ru/english/append20.html>.




Another important distinction between the Power-Sharing
Treaty and the supplemental agreements is the expiration periods.
The latter have a specific time period of five years, after which ei-
ther side may give notice to end the Agreement. 173 The term be-
gins on the date the agreement is signed and automatically renews
for another five-year period unless a party gives notice within six
months of the end of the term.174 The Power-Sharing Treaty, on
the other hand, has no set term and no express means for either
side to withdraw.
Of the thirty agreements this paper examined (covering
thirty-two of the eighty-nine subjects of the Russian Federation),
seventeen include supplemental agreements. 175 These supplemen-
tal agreements cover topics ranging from universally important is-
sues (economic cooperation, budgetary cooperation, and protec-
tion of the environment and use of natural resources) to issues
important only to a lone region (e.g., delimitation of powers in the
system of control of the Northern sea lanes - Sakha, development
of hop-growing - Chuvashiya, and use and protection of water
sources - Khabarovsk). In addition, the number of supplemental
agreements per region ranges from as few as three to as many as
eighteen.
1. The Supplementary Agreements in General
The supplementary agreements cover topics that can be
broadly grouped into four major categories: (1) the econ-
omy/finances of the subjects; (2) the control, use and division of
natural resources in the region between federal and regional gov-
ernments; (3) present and future environmental problems of the
region; and (4) the social welfare of the citizens/residents of the
region. Any set of agreements for a given region will have one or
more agreements on topics falling within these general groups.
A good example of the broad sweep of topics within a re-
gion's supplemental agreements is that of Tatarstan. Tatarstan's
agreements, the first signed by any of the regions, provided a
173. See id. at 671.
174. See id
175. This paper analyzes supplemental agreements from the following regions: Tatar-
stan, Bashkortostan, Yakutiya, Buryatiya, Udmurt Republic, Komi Republic, Chuvash
Republic, Krasnodarsk krai, Khabarovsk krai, Kaliningrad oblast, Sverdlovsk oblast,
Orenburg oblast, Irkutsk oblast, Sakhalin oblast, Nizhegorod oblast, Rostov oblast and St.
Petersburg oblast.
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model for future agreements. The first agreement provides an
overview of all of the agreements and concerns economic coopera-
tion.176 This agreement generally sets forth the areas in which the
federal and regional government will cooperate. Another impor-
tant point seen in both the Tatarstan agreement and other agree-
ments is the affirmation of a single open market and free move-
ment of goods and services.
177
Moreover, this agreement also provides an alternative to the
typical expiration clause found in nearly every other supplemental
agreement signed by the federal government. Most clauses have a
five-year term that is automatically renewed unless one party gives
written notice at least six months prior to the expiration of the
term. 178 This clause has a five-year term (with no automatic re-
newal) and allows a party to terminate the agreement (with one
year's notice) if the other party does not fulfill its obligations.
179
This latter clause is included in only one other agreement made
with the Republic of Sakha on economic questions.180 These two
agreements were both signed in early 1992, so it may be assumed
that the federal government no longer uses such a clause in its ne-
gotiations.
Because Tatarstan is a big oil producing region, one of its
agreements concerns cooperation in the areas of transport of oil
and oil by-products. This agreement, which was signed in 1993,
sets forth the principle that Tatarstan and its oil-producing enter-
prises will exercise as much autonomy as possible under federal
law in producing and transporting oil from the territory of the re-
public.181
In many of its supplementary agreements, Tatarstan does not
seek any definitive advantage, but merely attempts to include in
the agreements general statements or expressions of its sover-
eignty. These agreements tend to be somewhat hortatory in na-
ture. They include the agreements on protection of the environ-
176. See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 416. Similar agreements are signed with Bash-
kortostan, Yakutiya (Sakha), Krasnodar, and Orenburg. See id.
177. See id. at 692. "The Parties shall ensure the unity of the economic area, free
movement of goods, services and financial resources in accordance with the legislation of
the Russian Federation." Id.
178. See id. at 671.
179. See id. at 418.
180. See id. at 487.
181. See id. at 419.
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ment;182 higher education; 183 joint delegation of jurisdiction and
powers in the defense industry;184 the war on crime;185 and military
matters.
186
Other agreements are very general in nature, reading like a
long list of areas for future cooperation. These agreements, none-
theless, generally include one main provision fundamental to rela-
tions in that area. For instance, Tatarstan's agreement on property
states that government property on the territory of Tatarstan be-
longs to the government of Tatarstan, unless it belongs to one of
the Russian Ministries for Defense or Security.
187
Another example of these single-idea agreements demon-
strates that these agreements are generally in accordance with the
federal constitution and federal law. The agreement on customs
with Tatarstan states that the republic is part of a single Russian
customs area and the head of the Tatarstan regional customs ad-
ministration will be named by the Russian Customs Committee in
agreement with the Tatarstan government. 188 This provision cor-
responds to article 74 of the 1993 Constitution. Paragraph 1 states:
"No customs frontiers, duties, levies, or any other barriers for free
movement of goods, services, or financial means may be estab-
lished on the territory of the Russian Federation.' 189
182. The agreements in this area cover the following: Protection of the environment
and use of natural resources - Bashkortostan, Northern Ossetia, Yakutiya, Udmurtiya,
Komi, Sverdlovsk, Irkutsk, Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg; Establishment of conditions
of economic activities on the territory of the reservoir zone of Lake Baikal - Buryatiya,
Irkutsk; Destruction or conversion of objects for production of chemical weapons and liq-
uidation of the after-effects of production of chemical weapons - Chuvashiya. See d. at
442,480,492,527,540,572, 584, 653,714, 743,827.
183. Similar agreements are signed with Bashkortostan, Yakutiya, Komi, Krasnodarsk,
Rostov, and St. Petersburg. See id at 465,498, 570, 592,805, 829.
184. Similar agreements are signed with Bashkortostan, Northern Ossetia, Udmurtiya,
Sverdlovsk, Orenburg, Irkutsk, Nizhny Novgorod, and St. Petersburg. See id. at 451, 472,
542, 656,700,705,745,815.
185. Similar agreements are signed with Bashkortostan, Udmurtiya, Krasnodarsk,
Khabarovsk, Kaliningrad, Sverdlovsk, and Rostov. See id. at 454, 551, 603, 621, 648, 678,
773.
186. See id. at 420,423,429,432,438.
187. See id. at 425. Similar agreements are found with Northern Ossetia, Bashkor-
tostan, Udmurtiya, Krasnodarsk, Sverdlovsk, Rostov, and St. Petersburg. See id. at 448,
470, 536, 606, 682, 804, 835.
188. See id. at 427. Similar agreements have been signed with Bashkortostan, Yaku-
tiya, Udmurtiya, Krasnodarsk, and Rostov. See id. at 456, 496, 553, 612, 799.
189. KONsT. RF (1993), art. 74(1).
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Another very important agreement for the Republic of Tatar-
stan, demonstrating one of the advantages of the republics over
the other federal subjects, is the agreement on bank affairs, mone-
tary-credit and currency policies.190 Unlike the similar agreements
signed by other regions, this agreement establishes the basis for
the relationship between the Central Bank of the Russian Federa-
tion and the National Bank of the Republic of Tatarstan. 191 The
Power-Sharing Treaty grants Tatarstan the right to establish a na-
tional bank.192 The Republic of Bashkortostan is the only other
region that has this right. Unlike Tatarstan, Bashkortostan has not
yet followed up on this right with the required separate agree-
ment.1
93
2. Some Specific Agreements
a. Budgets and Taxes
The Russian federal government signed a supplemental
agreement with nearly every Power-Sharing Treaty region con-
cerning the relationship of the federal and the regional budgets. 19
4
This is a key area for agreement between the central government
and the subjects. Many of Russia's current critical economic
problems are a result of the budgetary problems poor tax collec-
tion created throughout the country. 195
One purpose of these supplementary agreements is to accel-
erate the settling up process between budgets. 196 In fact, these
supplementary agreements are only a first step toward establishing
the system of tax receipts sharing at the federal and regional level.
Moreover, recent events show the ineffectiveness of this system.
A recent presidential decree stated the federal government will
sign a new type of agreement on finances with all of the regions by
190. See id at 435.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 248.
193. See id at 261.
194. This type of agreement is signed with Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutiya, Ud-
murtiya, Komi, Krasnodarsk, Khabarovsk, Sverdlovsk, Irkutsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov,
and St. Petersburg. See id.
195. The tax system is established by the Constitution. In this system, the federal gov-
ernment collects taxes and, with part of the proceeds, helps fund regional development
programs. The regional governments also levy taxes to make up shortfalls in their budg-
ets. See Berke, Chechnya, supra note 75, at 879.




The present supplemental agreements are still useful as part
of the Power-Sharing Treaty process. As with many other steps in
this process, they demonstrate the federal government's suprem-
acy in certain areas. As seen previously, many provisions in
agreements that have been signed in more than one region are the
same or similar. Two of the provisions are key because they bring
the budgetary process firmly under federal control.
The first avers that "the general principles of taxation ... are
determined according to the legislation of the Russian Federa-
tion." 198 The second provision provides: "The formation of the
budget [of the region], and also the joint relations between the
federal budget and the budget [of the region] shall be imple-
mented in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federa-
tion." 19
9
A "federal fund for financial support of the regions" forms
the basis for the budgetary relationship between the federal and
regional governments." 20 0  Each region pays its share into this
fund, the amount of which is determined yearly on the basis of cer-
tain economic criteria. This fund is the basis for payments into
federally sponsored social welfare programs in each region.20 1
This set-up has naturally led to a situation where some regions pay
more into the fund than what they receive (donor regions) and
some pay less (recipient regions). Since some donor regions con-
sider this situation inequitable, these budget agreements are a way
for them to minimize (as much as possible) the payments they
need to make.
The first couple of budget agreements (with Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan) actually spelled out the taxes from which the re-
gion's payments into the fund would come. These included a
profit tax of thirteen percent, income tax on individuals of one
percent, a value-added tax of up to seventy five percent, and an in-
come tax of up to one hundred percent on foreign economic activi-
ties.20 2 Later agreements, however, have merely stated that the
197. Khristenko, Chelyabinsk Sign First Treaty on Improving Finances, 3 IEWS
RUSSIAN REGIONAL REPORT, June 6, 1998, at 10.
19& See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 750.
199. See id. art. 2.
200. See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 513.
201. See id.
202- See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 434.
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region will fulfill the obligation of "its powers, [delegated] to the
Russian Federation, [by making] payments into the federal budget
... [from sources and in amounts], yearly established by the Fed-
eral law on the federal budget for the corresponding year." 20 3
b. Natural Resources
Russia is one of the world's largest potential suppliers of oil,
natural gas and many other natural resources. Due to its federa-
tion system, control over those resources is not solely in the hands
of the federal government. As many Western oil companies can
attest, regional governments largely control the development and
distribution of these resources. Naturally, oil, gas, mining and log-
ging industries are important for economic development in the re-
gions and in Russia as a whole. It is no surprise, then, that many of
the regions have signed supplementary agreements in the area of
natural resources. 204
Many of the Power-Sharing Treaties leave to future agree-
ments, the question of "the division of natural resources on the
territory [of the region]" between federal and local governmental
control.20 5 Some supplementary agreements include lists of crude
oil deposits that fall under federal and state control. 20 6 For the
most part, however, the agreements on natural resources are based
on the premise that "[t]he land, the depths of the earth, the waters,
and other natural resources, located on the territory [of the re-
gion], being the property of the people, shall be used and pro-
tected as the basis of their life and activities. ' 207 The parties to the
agreements generally accept that the presence of natural resources
on the territory concerns federal, regional and joint jurisdic-
203. Id. at 576.
204. Agreements on various aspects of the natural resources of the regions have been
signed. They include the following: Protection of the environment and use of natural re-
sources - Bashkortostan, Northern Ossetia, Yakutiya, Udmurtiya, Komi, Sverdlovsk,
Irkutsk, Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg; Fuel-energy complex - Bashkortostan, Yaku-
tiya, Komi, Khabarovsk, Sverdlovsk, Rostov; Control, use and disposal of lands and other
natural resources - Northern Ossetia, Udmurtiya, Khabarovsk, Sverdlovsk, Orenburg,
Irkutsk, Sakhalin, Rostov, St. Petersburg; Mining industry - Yakutiya; Mineral-raw mate-
rial base - Buryatiya; Mineral use - Irkutsk, Rostov; Control, use and disposal of forest
resources - Udmurtiya, Sverdlovsk, Sakhalin; Development of hop-growing - Chuvashiya;
Use and protection of bodies of water - Khabarovsk. See generally id.
205. See id. at 322.
206. See idL at 547.




While the natural resources covered in the agreements range
as widely as a list of natural 'resources in Russia, including oil and
oil by-products, mining (coal, tin, antimony), territorial seas and
rivers, and forests, the agreements mostly focus on the oil (fuel)-
energy complex. Many of these agreements contain declarations
of future cooperation with assistance to and support for energy in-
dustries in the regions.20 9 The agreements also include several
substantive points of interest in this area.
Since the energy industries were, and for the most part still
are, state owned, many of the agreements include provisions con-
cerning the possible privatization of these enterprises. Specifically,
any privatization of energy enterprises located in the region must
take into account the privatization programs of the regional gov-
ernment and any agreements the region may have reached with
the Federation Ministry of fuel and energy.210
Although rights to oil and natural gas are important, the
transport of these resources to their final destination is just as im-
portant. Consequently, many of the key provisions in these natu-
ral resources agreements concern the regions' rights to distribute
their product freely. A major consideration for the regions is non-
discrimination in access to the federally controlled system of pipe-
lines.211
The regions want to ensure that their oil and gas enterprises
have "equal access" to the pipeline system and uniform rates for
the "transport of oil, oil products and natural gas on the territory
[of the region] and the Russian Federation" regardless of whether
the enterprise is sending crude oil, refined oil, or natural gas. 212
The regions also seek to eliminate discrimination in government
procurement of oil and gas so that "[t]he enterprises of the fuel-
energy complex [of the region] have an equal right to receive gov-
ernment orders for delivery and shipment of oil and oil products
208. See id.
209. See id at 446.
210. See id.
211. See id. art. 6. "The transport of oil and oil products by main oil pipelines and oil
product pipelines shall be implemented on the basis of calculated balances and schedules
of output, deliveries, refinement of oil, production of oil products, and confirmation by the
Ministry of fuel and energy of Russia." Id.
212 See id art. 7.
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for government needs." 213
Since the Russian government still subsidizes the cost of en-
ergy for its citizens, it is hard for oil and gas companies to make
money selling their products only to the government. Therefore,
energy companies seek to sell their oil and gas to other countries
at world prices so that they can earn a profit and receive payments
in currencies other than the ruble.
There are two important provisions regulating this area. Be-
cause both provisions benefit the federal government, there is fear
that oil and gas producers will sell all of their output at world mar-
ket prices.214 First, the federal and regional authorities must agree
yearly on the volume of oil and gas output that may be sold out-
side of the Russian Federation.2 15 Second, both regional and fed-
eral law will regulate the regional oil and gas producers who sell
their products beyond either regional or Russian borders. 216
c. International and Foreign Economic Ties
The supplementary agreements regarding international and
foreign economic ties are important for two reasons. First, they
foster economic recovery in the regions. The regions are geo-
graphically situated to attract desired foreign investments, and
provide the opportunity to sign economic agreements with foreign
enterprises and governments. Second, they demonstrate the in-
creasing importance of this provision to the regions. Over the
course of signing Power-Sharing Treaties and their associated sup-
plementary agreements, the provision on international and eco-
nomic ties has had progressively more influence on the structure of
the federal/regional relationships.
The agreements on international and foreign economic ties
demonstrate three main points. First, international and foreign
economic relations issues are within the joint jurisdiction of the
federal and regional governments. 217 In fact, most of the supple-
213. See id. art. 6(2).
214. This scenario is similar to that which happened in Nigeria under General Sani
Abacha. The people of Nigeria could not easily obtain fuel in their country, or paid hand-
somely for it, because the oil was sold outside of the country at world prices. JOHN
VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 243 (1988).
215. See Bashkortostan Agreement on the Fuel-Energy Complex, art. 5; Federalizm,
supra note 11, at 446.
216. See id. art. 9.
217. Supplementary agreements in this area are found with the following: Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, Northern Ossetia, Yakutiya, Buryatiya, Komi, Sverdlovsk, Orenburg,
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mentary agreements involving international economic ties include
provisions that separate the powers into either sole regional con-
trol or joint jurisdiction.
218
The agreements also allow for cooperation between the fed-
eral and regional governments on the concepts underlying the in-
ternational and foreign economic ties in question.219 The agree-
ments also require regular annual meetings of the representatives
of the federal and regional Ministries of Foreign Economic Af-
fairs.22
0
Finally, while the Power-Sharing Treaty provisions have given
the "organs of state power of the Russian Federation" the right to
coordinate the foreign economic ties of the region, the supplemen-
tary agreements allow more participation by the region in this pro-
cess in that:
The control of implementation of foreign trade activities shall
be performed by the corresponding federal organs of executive
power and the organs of executive power [of the region] with
the goal of observing the provisions of federal law ... of the
Russian Federation on foreign trade activities and with the goal
of protecting the economic and political interests of the Russian
Federation and [the region].
221
Notably, the subject's right to sign international and foreign
economic agreements has gained more prominence in the negotia-
tions of the Power-Sharing Treaties and their supplemental
agreements. In the earliest treaties, reference to this right was in-
cluded in the list of areas subject to joint federal and regional ju-
risdiction. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Buryatiya, Northern Ossetia,
and Komi have developed that right and signed a more detailed
supplementary agreement on international economic ties. The
later treaties, however, have included a specific provision for in-
ternational and foreign economic ties. The separate provision of
Sakhalin, Nizhny Novgorod. See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 437, 463,478, 518, 529, 559,
674,698,733,748.
218. See Orenburg Oblast Agreement on International and Foreign Economic Ties,
art. 1, 2; Federalizm, supra note 11, at 698.
219. See Northern Ossetia Agreement on Foreign Economic Ties, art. 1; Federalizm,
supra note 11, at 478. "The government of the Russian Federation and the government of
the Republic of Northern Ossetia - Alaniya shall agree upon the concepts and programs of
development of foreign economic ties and coordinate them within the framework of issues
falling within the sphere of joint jurisdiction." Id.
220. See Northern Ossetia Agreement on foreign economic ties, art. 4.
221. See id. at 676.
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the later treaties generally included sufficient detail such that no
supplemental agreement on the topic was necessary. As a result, it
is unlikely that regions signing later treaties also signed supple-
mental agreements.
E. The Federal Law on the Treaties and Agreements
On April 25, 1997, the Russian Duma legitimized the process
of signing Power-Sharing Treaties and their supplemental agree-
ments even more by adopting the "Federal Law on the Principle
and Order of the Delimitation of Jurisdiction and Powers between
the Organs of State power of the Russian Federation and the Or-
gans of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation
(Federal Law). '222 Arguably, this law could either help federalize
Russia or undermine the entire treaty process. 223
This law sets forth eight basic principles to guide all future
negotiations for Power-Sharing Treaties or supplementary agree-
ments.224 These eight principles are:
1. Constitutionalism, i.e., no federal laws or regional constitutions
or laws may redistribute or exclude the division of jurisdiction
established in the Federal Constitution.
225
2. Supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and
federal law over any treaties or agreements signed.
226
3. Equality of the Russian Federation's subjects in the prepara-
tion and conclusion of treaties and agreements.
227
4. The signing of a treaty or agreement with one subject should
not intolerably harm the rights or interests of the other subjects
of the Federation.22
8
5. Coordination of the Russian Federation's interests and the in-
terests of the subjects of the Russian Federation.229
222. See Federal Law on the Principle and Order of the Delimitation of Jurisdiction
and Powers between the Organs of State power of the Russian Federation and the Organs
of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation [hereinafter Federal Law], (Mar.
15, 1994) http://www.friends-partners.org/oldfriends/constitution/russian-const-
conclud.html; see also Federalizm, supra note 11, at 838.
223. See Federalizm, supra note 11, at 142.
224. See id.
225. See Federal Law, supra note 222, art. 3.
226. See id. art. 4.
227. See id. art. 5.
228. See id. art. 6.
229. See id. art. 7.
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6. Voluntariness of concluding a treaty or agreement. 230
7. The principle of being provided with financial, material-
technical and other resources.
231
8. Openness in concluding treaties or agreements.
232
Federal law provides procedures for concluding treaties and
agreements, e.g. language (Russian) and terms of the parties to the
treaties or agreements.233 The law also addresses the adoption or
rejection of the treaties or agreements, as well as signatures, publi-
cation and entry into force.234 Most interestingly, this law pre-
scribes the issues, which may be covered by the treaties or agree-
ments.
The authority of a Power-Sharing Treaty is three-fold. It
may: (1) actualize the jurisdiction and powers that the Constitu-
tion and federal law establish; (2) address the conditions and im-
plementation procedures of the powers delimited by the treaty;
and (3) cover the forms of cooperation and coordination (and any
other related questions) during the execution of the provisions of
the treaty. 235
Additionally, supplemental agreements address other con-
cerns. A supplemental agreement can cover the following issues:
(1) the transfer of powers; (2) the conditions and procedure for
transfer of implementation of powers; (3) the material-financial
basis of transfer of powers; and (4) the forms of cooperation and
coordination (and other related questions) during the execution of
the provisions of the agreement.
236
Similar to many of the Power-Sharing Treaties themselves,
this federal law provides guidance for resolving disputes arising
from a treaty or agreement. Simply, the parties should negotiate
disputes using the agreed conciliatory procedures. 237 If this proc-
ess does not resolve the matter, the dispute should be referred to
the appropriate court, including the Constitutional Court, when
necessary. 238
230. See id. art. 8.
231. See id. art. 9.
232. See idt art. 10.
233. See id. arts. 15, 16, 19, 20.
234. See id. arts. 23, 24, 25, 26, 28.
235. See id. art. 17.
236. See id. art. 18.
237. See id. art. 29(1).
238. See id arts. 29(3), 30.
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This law sets the stage for examining the effect of signing
Power-Sharing Treaties on federal-regional relations and the fed-
eral structure that binds them. Moreover, this law can be viewed
as a proper structure for, and the next logical step in, the treaty-
signing process by allowing the supremacy of the Constitution to
be utmost in all negotiations. Such a detailed law, however, may
end up taking away the administration's flexibility in negotiation.
This may lead to a stalling or disintegration of the Power-Sharing
Treaty process.
III. How THE POWER-SHARING TREATIES AFFECT RUSSIA'S
FEDERALISM
"Federalism [is] no longer an issue" - soon after the adoption
of the 1993 Constitution, Yeltsin's nationalities adviser Emil
Paen.23
9
A. The Constitutional Federal Structure
"The multinational people of the Russian Federation shall be
the vehicle of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Rus-
sian Federation."240
In examining the asymmetry of the Russian Constitution, it is
important to remember the history of this vast and multinational
country. The forces of history have built a country through and
around hundreds of different ethnic groups. 241 It is, perhaps, un-
avoidable that the Russian Constitution gives some of the Federa-
tion's subjects greater autonomy within the federal structure than
others. 24
2
A federal state has been defined as consisting of "two levels
of government ruling the same land and people, each having at
least one area of action in which it has guaranteed autonomy. '243
Many countries, including the United States, Canada, Brazil,
Germany, Australia, India and Nigeria use the federal system of
government.244 As in Russia, it is not uncommon to find that the
239. See AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 133.
240. KONST. RF (1993) art. 3(1).
241. See Robert Sharlet, The Prospects of Federalism In Russian Constitutional Politics,
24 PUBLIUS J. FED. 115, 118 (1994).
242. See id.
243. See Lynn & Novikov, REFEDERALIZING, supra note 23, at 188 (citing WILLIAM
H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE (1964)).
244. See Ronald L. Watts, The Contemporary Relevance of the Federal Idea, 1995 ST.
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federal state is composed of many nationalities. 245 It is thought
that the federal system may allow "a close institutional approxima-
tion to the multinational reality of the contemporary world" by
acknowledging "the need for large-scale political and economic
organization with the recognition and protection of ethnic, linguis-
tic, or historically-derived diversity."
246
Moreover, the trend in federalism is to accept asymmetry in
the governmental structure in order to further the integration of
regional units into the Federation.247 There are a number of ex-
amples in present day systems of such accommodation. The
autonomous communities of Spain and the European Union with
different speeds for different members are examples of such ac-
commodation.248 Perhaps the most pertinent example for the
Russian Federation, and one that has been looked to as a guiding
light for Russia's federal system, is Canada.249 From the begin-
ning, Canada's system has included an asymmetrical relationship
with Quebec, which is considered a "distinct society" within the
country.2
50
On the basis of the definition of a federal system and the
trend toward including asymmetries in a federal system, it is easy
to see how Russia came to its current state of federalism. Yet even
for a typical constitutional form, the Russian Constitution shows
very early on that it has mixed feelings about granting some re-
gions special treatment.
Article 5 is a perfect example, since it declares the regions
equal, yet gives greater recognition to the republics. 251 The re-
publics, krais, oblasts, okrugs and federal cities are considered to
be equal subjects of the Federation.252 All of the subjects are also
considered to "be equal among themselves in relations with the
LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 109, 110 (1995). Others include Venezuela, Ar-
gentina, Mexico, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and Malaysia. See id.
245. See id. at 116.
246. See id at 110.
247. See id. at 111.
248. See id
249. See id at 118.
250. See id. Quebec still may opt out of Canada, although recent years have seen the
Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Consensus which have tried to find an acceptable
level (to both Quebec and the other provinces) of special treatment. See id.
251. KONST. RF (1993), art. 5(1).
252- See iL
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Federal organs of state power." 25 3 The same constitutional article,
however, allows republics to have their own constitution, while the
other subjects may have only a charter.254 This inequity is further
reinforced in Article 66 that states that the Russian Constitution
and the subject's constitution, in the case of a republic, or charter,
for every other region define the status of a region.
255
The Russian Constitution also recognizes the special status of
the republics by allowing them the "right to institute their own
state languages," to be used alongside the Russian language, the
state language of the Russian Federation, in all official proceed-
ings.256 The constitutional asymmetries are not as drastic as they
were before. The republics had previously enjoyed a more privi-
leged status than other regions in areas such as taxation and natu-
ral resources and even authority for dual citizenship.
257
B. The Treaties' Effect on the Federal Structure
"The jurisdiction and powers of the organs of state power of
the Russian Federation and the organs of state power of the sub-
jects of the Russian Federation shall be delimited under this Con-
stitution, Federal and other Treaties on the delimitation of jurisdic-
tion and powers (emphasis added). '258
In examining the Power-Sharing Treaties, it is important to
look at their purpose. The Russian central government is con-
cerned with preserving a Federation. The subjects of that Federa-
tion are trying to establish their autonomy within the federal struc-
ture. Although both sides may have gotten most of what they each
want thus far, the concern is whether the two sides can reconcile
and accommodate their further wishes in the future as well.
It is important to note that this is not the first time in history
that Russia has used Power-Sharing Treaties to consolidate the po-
sition of its government. In the early years after the Revolution,
the RSFSR needed to use a series of treaties with some of the later
Union Republics to bring together the Union Republics into what
would later become the Soviet Union.259 The first treaty was with
253. See id. art. 5(4).
254. See id. art. 5(2).
255. See id art. 66(1), (2).
256. See id art. 68(2).
257. See AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 133.
258. KONsT. RF (1993), art. 11(3).
259. See NATIONALITIES, supra note 1, at 36.
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Azerbaidjan in September 1920.260 Later in 1920, the Russian
government signed a treaty with Ukraine and then in 1921, it
signed treaties with Byelorussia, Georgia and Armenia. 261 Fur-
thermore, the treaties that the RSFSR signed with these govern-
ments were not identical. The 1921 treaties were based on either
the model of Azerbaidjan or of Ukraine.262
The parallels between the 1920 and 1921 treaties and the pre-
sent-day Power-Sharing Treaties are very close. The RSFSR was
embroiled in the post-revolutionary civil war between the "red"
communists and the "white" nationalists. It needed to keep or
bring certain areas into the RSFSR (future Soviet Union) govern-
mental structure. It used treaties, tailored to the individual (future
Union) republics to secure their acquiescence to ally with the
RSFSR.26
3
While the situation in Russia today cannot truly be called a
civil war, the violence in breakaway Chechnya and the atmosphere
of sovereignty declarations since Russia left the Soviet Union is
very similar to that of post-revolutionary times.264 Furthermore,
the present-day Russian Federation has used a series of unique
treaties to keep many of its regions allied to its governmental
structure.2
65
The Russian Federation crossed two major hurdles through
the use of the Power-Sharing Treaty. First, despite the controver-
sial birth of the Russian Constitution, the government generated
some tacit support for the current Constitution. Over half of the
regions of the Federation have signed a Power-Sharing Treaty with
the federal government.266 Each of these treaties establishes the
supremacy of the federal constitution and federal law over re-
gional law.267 Variances between regions only occur when juris-
dictional areas are under partial or full control of the regional gov-
ernment.268 The supremacy of the Constitution and federal law,
260. See id.
261. See id. at 37.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Moscow Rules Out Independence for Chechnya [hereinafter Moscow],
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 19, 1997.
265. See Lynn & Novikov, REFEDERALIZING, supra note 23, at 199.
266. See Marat S. Salikov, Russian and American Federation: Comparative and Legal
Analysis of their Origins and Developments, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 161,179 (1996).
267. See id. at 181; see also Lynn & Novikov, REFEDERALIZING, supra note 23.
268. See Lynn & Novikov, REFEDERALIZING, supra note 23, at 201-02.
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however, remains constant.
In this respect, it is important to remember the controversy
surrounding the adoption of the Constitution in 1993. President
Yeltsin turned to a popular referendum only after every other
means of adoption was deemed too undemocratic or unwork-
able.269 One of the unworkable means was the idea of getting two-
thirds of the regions to approve the Constitution.270 At the time,
there was too much resistance to the Constitution and to the man-
ner that it provided for regional authority. 271 Now, however,
forty-six of the eighty-nine regions have submitted to the authority
of the federal Constitution.272 If the federal government signs thir-
teen more Power-Sharing Treaties, it will surpass that magical two-
thirds mark, albeit perhaps unintentionally.
Resorting to Power-Sharing Treaties resolved a second major
problem facing the federal government: disintegrating the federa-
tion. At the time of the break-up of the former Soviet Union,
many of the Russian regions began to make noises about declaring
outright independence, just as the former Union Republics of the
Soviet Union had done. To placate the restive regions, the Rus-
sian government signed a Federation Treaty with the Republics
and signed other similar treaties with the other regions of the
soon-to-be federation.
This strategy worked for a short time. Once the Constitution
was adopted, however, the republics once again threatened inde-
pendence. The clamor only subsided when the federal govern-
ment decided to sign individual Power-Sharing Treaties with the
republics. 273 Targeting the most independence-minded regions
and giving them more powers than provided by the Constitution
kept the federation together.274 The process has now spread to
nearly all of the regions, rather than just independence-seeking re-
gions. Although this has made the Power-Sharing Treaty process
appear more just, there are treaties that still affirm and widen the
Constitution's unequal treatment of regions.
To the regions, the Power-Sharing Treaties may be consid-
ered a success. The regions were politically empowered by the at-
269. See AHDIEH, RUSSIA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 72.
270. See id. at 63.
271. See id.
272. See generally Lynn & Novikov, REFEDERALIZING, supra note 23, at 190-91.
273. See id. at 199.
274. See id. at 192.
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tention that the federal government was paying to the regions'
problems. Furthermore, many of the regions gained significant le-
gal concessions from the federal government in exchange for
signing the Power-Sharing Treaty. For many of the regions, these
gains were made at little or no expense. The alternative of be-
coming independent states is much less desirable because most
oblasts, krais or even republics could not survive as such. For giv-
ing up this untenable position, these regions ended up in a much
better position, vis-A-vis the other regions.
Chechnya and Tatarstan provide the best examples of suc-
cessfully implemented Power-Sharing Treaties. Both of these re-
publics entered into agreements with the federal government
granting them greater autonomy while remaining within the Fed-
eration. Tatarstan and Chechnya refused to sign the Federation
Treaty because it gave insufficient autonomy to the republics.
Chechnya resorted to a vicious guerilla war to gain its independ-
ence while Tatarstan remained within the Federation because of
the federal government's promise of further autonomy.
Chechnya and Tatarstan share a common history as home-
lands for displaced minorities. During World War II, seven na-
tionalities, including the Chechens and the Tatars, were deported
from their homes and dispersed throughout Siberia and Central
Asia.275 In 1941, the Volga Germans were deported to Siberia for
fear that they would conspire with Hitler's army.276 A few years
later, the Crimean Tatars were relocated because of similar
fears.277 Soon thereafter, the Caucasus nationalities (Chechens,
Ingushi, Kalmyks, Karachai and Balkars) were displaced. 278 The
Soviet authorities did not resettle most of the nationalities until
the late 1950s, when Stalin's acts were repudiated.279 The Volga
Germans and the Tatars never resettled, but were kept in their
relocated "homeland. 280
Despite their similar histories, these two republics have dif-
ferent cultures. The Chechen people have always been fiercely in-
dependent and had conflicts with the Soviet government. This
may be a result of their geographic location. Chechnya lies on




279. See id. at 105.
280. See id.
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Russia's periphery, where, if it became an independent state, it
would share borders with two sovereign states, Russia and Geor-
gia. Conversely, the Russian Federation surrounds Tatarstan on
all sides. Moreover, Chechnya is a republic that is predominantly
Muslim with a population of about 1,100,000 people; approxi-
mately two-thirds of which are Chechens and one-third Russian.
281
The conflict in Chechnya began when President Yeltsin sent
troops into the republic and instituted an economic blockade in re-
sponse to Chechen nationalists declaring independence in late
1991.282 Neither side wanted to give in, feeling confident that it
had the moral and international law upper hand. 283 The conflict
continued until the Yeltsin administration, responding to pressure
from without Russia, agreed to a peaceful resolution with the
Chechen Republic.
284
This agreement is embodied in the "Treaty on Peace and the
Principles of Joint Relations between the Russian Federation and
the Chechen Republic Ichkeriya" of May 12, 1997.285 This Treaty
consists of three broad and powerful provisions. First, the Parties
agreed to refrain from using force or the threat of force to solve
their problems. 286 Second, the Parties agreed to build their rela-
tions on the basis of international law.287 Third, the Parties agreed
to cooperate in areas that are to be determined by future agree-
ments. This Treaty is the basis for all future agreements between
the Russian Federation and Chechnya.28
8
Russia and Chechnya signed two additional agreements on
May 12, 1997.289 The overall goal of these agreements is to im-
prove the overall economic situation in Chechnya. The goals of
the first agreement are to improve the lives of the Chechen resi-
dents, and to provide compensation to the victims of the Chechen
conflict and to re-establish the social-economic system in the Re-
281. See Berke, Chechnya, supra note 75, at 882.
282. See iL at 881.
283. Chechnya based its claim to independence on international principles of self-
determination. Russia, meanwhile, relied on the right to the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation. See id
284. See Berke, Chechnya, supra note 75, at 888.
285. See Chechnya Treaty; Federalizm, supra note 11, at 292.
286. See Chechnya Treaty, art. 1.
287. See id art. 2.
288. See id. arts. 2-3.
289. See Federalzm, supra note 11, at 588-89.
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public.290 The goals of the second agreement are the federal and
republic government Parties and their banks.291 The goal of the
agreement is twofold: (1) establish the Russian ruble as the only
legal currency for "monetary payments" within Chechnya; and (2)
strictly limiting the power of the Central Bank of Chechnya within
the Russian system of Banks.
Unfortunately, these agreements have not assisted Chechnya
in benefiting from remaining a republic within the Russian Federa-
tion. Chechnya has failed to gain recognition as a sovereign state
in the West and politically, it remains a renegade republic within
the Russian Federation. Additionally, the agreement on currency
and banking has curtailed much-needed financial support.292
In contrast, Tatarstan's situation differs greatly from that of
Chechnya. Tatarstan declared independence in 1990. In 1992, na-
tionalist Tatars began to seek more economic autonomy, including
total independence.293 Tatarstan eventually agreed to abandon to-
tal independence in exchange for greater autonomy within the
Russian Federation. The Tatarstan negotiations became the
model for future Power-Sharing Treaties. Tatarstan eventually
agreed to sign a Power-Sharing Treaty because it more clearly de-
fined the relationship of the center to the regions.294 Tatarstan
was given responsibility for developing its own budget, creating its
own national bank, and concluding agreements with foreign gov-
ernments. 2
95
Tatarstan and Chechnya exemplify the advantage to the fed-
eral government implementing Power-Sharing Treaties. The fed-
eral government, by persuading Tatarstan to remain within the
federation, arguably defused a chain reaction of Chechnya-like
conflicts throughout the country and established express constitu-
tional relations with over half of the republics. 296 The advantage
to the regions of implementing Power-Sharing Treaties includes
avoiding armed conflict and increasing their autonomy beyond the
290. See Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the
Government of the Chechen Republic Ichkeriya; Federalizm, supra note 11, at 588.
291. See Agreement on the Peculiarities of the Organization of Circulation of Money
and Payments by Check; Federalizm, supra note 11, at 589.
292 See id.
293. See generally Sharlet, supra note 241, at 119.
294. See Lynn & Novikov, REFEDERALIZING, supra note 23, at 199.
295. See Moscow, supra note 264.
296. See Lynn & Novikov, REFEDERALIZING, supra note 23, at 200.
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power conferred to them by the federal constitution.
C. The Future of the Agreements and Federalism in Russia.
I feel that if we actually want to have a truly federative state, Rus-
sia must sign bilateral treaties with all the republics forming the
Federation. Because it is not the krais and oblasts that form the
Federation... there are those among us who want to make the
republics, oblasts, and krais completely equal politically. That
cannot be allowed. Economically they must all be identical ....
But there are questions that arise, for instance, in Bashkiria and
Tatarstan, that do not arise in the oblasts. In Sverdlovsk oblast,
for example, the nationality question does not arise. - Muraza
Rakhimov, President of Bashkortostan in 1994.297
The future of the Power-Sharing agreements and federalism
in Russia is fraught with a number of problems. One problem is
establishing a stable form of federation. Even though the federal
government and the regions have made positive steps in creating a
workable federation, the regions' relationships with the center are
constantly subject to negotiation (and coercion), creating an ele-
ment of uncertainty on every level.
A second problem is the adoption by regional and local gov-
ernments of legislation that contradicts federal law. This is what
Anatoly Chubais, former Russian Deputy Prime Minister, has
called "legal separatism."298 The Power-Sharing Treaties establish
the supremacy of federal law. Many of the republics, however,
have constitutional provisions that violate the federal constitu-
tion.299 Some say this is due, in part, to the inability of the center
to pay its debts to the regions. 300 Thus, the regions adopt legisla-
tion that contradicts federal laws in an attempt to improve their
economic situation. By compromising the integrity of the Federa-
tion with concessions to the regions, the federal government may
have facilitated "legal separatism." The regions are pursuing a
policy to "withdraw from close ties with the rest of the federation
297. Steven Solnick, Federal Bargaining in Russia, 4 E. EUR. CONST. L. REV. 52, citing
the Russian newspaper, Segodnya (Today), Aug. 12, 1994, at 10 [hereinafter Solnick, Fed-
eral Bargaining].
298. See Anna Paretskaya, Russian Central Authorities Seek New Formula for Rela-
tions with the Regions (Analytical Brief #460), Open Media Research Institute
<http://www.iews.org> [hereinafter Paretskaya, Central Authorities].
299. See id.; see also RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 139.
300. See generally Paretskaya, Central Authorities, supra note 298.
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and establish autarkic political and economic systems on their ter-
ritories." 301 This policy has been called "internal emigration.
30 2
A third problem is the evolving system of federation. This in-
cludes movements to increase or decrease the number of subjects
of the Federation. For example, Khanti-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets,
autonomous okrugs with large amounts of natural resources, are
seeking to disassociate from the oblast in order to receive more
proceeds from the sale of their natural resources.30 3 In addition,
St. Petersburg and the oblast within which it is located, Leningrad
oblast, seek to combine into one larger region.
304
One suggested resolution to this problem is to redesign the
boundaries of the federation to reduce the number of regions.
30 5
A redesign may lessen the administrative burden and bring equity
to the Federation, where republics wield more power even though
the majority of Russia's population lives in the krais and oblasts.
306
Unfortunately, this solution would require many regional leaders
to give up their power. A change from 89 to 10 or 12 regions
would significantly decrease the number of regional leaders, thus,
losing their jobs, power and influence.
Another proposed solution was to establish regional associa-
tions similar to the eight such associations that already exist: the
Northwest Association, Russia's Central Area Association, the
301. See id.
302. See id. Citing Dmitrii Badovskii's Article, published in the November 10, 1997,
issue of Segodnya.
303. Judith Perera & Andrei Ivanov, Russia: Resource-Rich Tyumen Region Faces
Breakup and Poverty, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 3, 1996. Yamal-Nenets Autonomous
okrug and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous okrug control 90 percent of Russia's natural gas
and 53 percent of its oil reserves. Enterprises in Tyumen oblast would pay up to 70 per-
cent of the income they gain from pumping oil and gas out of the ground to the federal
and regional budgets. Sixty percent of this money goes into the okrug and local budgets
while the federal and oblast (regional) governments get 20 percent each. The okrugs want
to secede from Tyumen oblast so that they can claim the 20 percent that would otherwise
go to the regional government. At present, Tyumen oblast is the richest region in the Rus-
sian Federation, but if its three parts are divided, Khanty-Mansi becomes the richest, while
Yamal-Nenets drops to 15th, and the part of Tyumen oblast not included in the okrugs
falls to 50th (out of 89). See id.
304. See Paretskaya, Central Authorities, supra note 298.
305. See Lynn & Novikov, REFEDERALIZING, supra note 23, at 192.
306. See Solnick, Federal Bargaining, supra note 297, at 52-58. Professor Solnick
points out the fact that Russians constitute a majority in nine of the 20 ethnic republics.
The titular minority group represents an absolute majority of the population in just six of
them. These statistics further weaken the avowed reason (they represent ethnic "home-
lands") that republics get extra concessions. See id. at 55.
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"Black Earth" Association, the Association of Northern Caucasus
Regions, the "Big Volga" Association, the Urals Regional Asso-
ciation, the "Siberian Accord" Association, and the Far East As-
sociation. 307 These associations are politically and economically
heterogeneous and may make it easier for the federal government
to meet regional needs and demands. On the other hand, at least
one commentator has remarked that the federal government's use
of Power-Sharing Treaties has weakened, to the center's benefit,
inter-regional cooperation, especially among the republics. 30 8 If
this sort of divide and conquer strategy has helped Moscow keep
the upper hand with the regions, then the organization of so many
associations may have negative implications for the center and,
consequently, for the Federation's continued viability.
The federal government might channel resources into local
governments, where practical politics dominate as another way of
solving the problems between it and the regions. 30 9 It is, of course,
practical politics that bring the federal government to the point
where it is willing to make concessions in the first place. Just re-
cently, Moscow made its first attempt to implement this strategy.
President Yeltsin gives broad-based federal support to the creation
of the Congress of Municipalities, a grouping of municipalities and
associations of municipalities.310 The federal government often
seeks to work with local officials in order to keep regional authori-
ties in check, so this is a natural step on its part.311
If this strategy is implemented correctly, it could lead to a
Russian version of the European Union's principle of subsidiarity.
If the federal government can tolerate the idea of economic and
political decision-making at the lowest possible level, then the
problem of asymmetry in the Russian Federation may turn out to
be moot. In such a federation, the regions would have a large
amount of autonomy and the federal government would only con-
trol the issues that only the central government can properly ad-
dress, such as defense, currency, communications and foreign pol-
icy. The danger, however, is that if the central government
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 135.
310. Congress of Municipalities Founded, IEWS RUSSIAN REGIONAL REPORT, June
25, 1998, at 2.
311. Governor versus Mayor: The Conflict between the Sverdlovsk Governor and the
Yekaterinburg Mayor, IEWS RUSSIAN REGIONAL REPORT, Vol. 3, June 25, 1998, at 7.
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devolves so much power to the regions and municipalities, localism
will grip the country and it will be almost impossible to implement
any political or economic policies at any level higher than that of
the town or city.
312
CONCLUSION
"It is yet too early to tell." - Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Enlai,
when asked by Henry Kissinger what he thought about the French
Revolution. 3
13
Zhu Enlai's observation about the French Revolution also
applies to the break-up of the Soviet Union or the future of the
second Russian Republic. The political situation in Russia is so
chaotic that it is impossible to predict whether Russia will eventu-
ally succeed in becoming a true federal democracy or whether it
will fall apart completely. There is also the possibility of the coun-
try falling back under the sway of a strong leader, who would come
to power on promises of an end to corruption, crime and capital-
ism and a return to the country's former status as a superpower.
Rather than dread the Communist party's return to power, many
look at certain politicians like Alexander Lebed in Krasnoyarsk or
Yurii Luzhkov in Moscow and see the portent of fascism on the
horizon. 3
14
Optimism still reigns in many quarters, however. News re-
ports contain as many stories of entrepreneurial success in Russia
as they do of corruption and poverty among the people. As each
crisis passes, democracy and free-market ideas become more en-
trenched in the public mind. Likewise, the false nostalgia for the
"security and stability" of the former Soviet Union fades further
into the past.
This argument of "entrenchment" can also be used in favor of
the role of the Power-Sharing Treaties in developing Russia's fed-
eralism. As the present governmental system succeeds in resolving
the problems that are at the root of any particular crisis, that gov-
ernmental system becomes more familiar and secure to the people.
With time, it too will become entrenched in the public mind.
31Z See Stephan Kux, Confederalism and Stability in the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States, 1 NEw EUR. L. REV. 387, 395 (Spring 1993).
313. Id. at 389.
314. See Russia's Crisis: Could it lead to fascism?, THE ECONOMIST, July 11, 1998, at
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Even with the chaos that still exists to a large degree in Rus-
sia, there have been some recent events in the Power-Sharing
Treaty arena that may bear out the main points of this thesis.
A Presidential decree of May 5, 1998 stated that the federal
government would sign "agreements on finances" with all of the
subjects by July 5, 1998.315 Predictably, this deadline passed seeing
only a couple of agreements actually signed. Some regional gov-
ernments even made headlines by refusing to sign a new agree-
ment.316 The steps taken to introduce this new type of agreement,
however, may show the proper resolve in the "Party of power" to
begin to solve Russia's underlying financial and economic prob-
lems.
These new agreements are a qualitatively new kind of agree-
ment between the federal government and the regions, intended to
help the economic situation in Russia overall.
This type of agreement will force the regions to follow federal
standards in credit agreements, housing issues, wage levels and re-
structuring of tax debts. The agreement will require the oblast to
pay its wage debts to all public sector employees and avoid similar
problems in the future. If the region meets the terms of the
agreement, it will have access to additional federal funding in the
future.
It is also important to note that the President's administration
is seeking to keep this "new agreement" within the framework of
the constitutional relationship established between the center and
the region by its Power-Sharing Treaty. In one instance, the
agreement signed with Chelyabinsk oblast on June 14, 1998, the
new agreement on finances was signed alongside a number of sup-
plemental agreements, which were themselves signed in accor-
dance with the region's Power-Sharing Treaty.
Sergei Kirienko, Russia's former Prime Minister, recently
stated that he is "positively inclined toward treaty-based relation-
ships between Moscow and the regions, as they provide a civilized
way of negotiating differences while adhering to the basic body of
law."317 This is the point of the Power-Sharing Treaties in the first
315. See Khristenko, Chelyabinsk Sign First Treaty on Improving Finances, IEWS
RUSSIAN REGIONAL REPORT, Vol. 3, No. 24, June 18, 1998, at 10.
316. See Petersburg Refuses to Sign Federal Treaty, IEWS RUSSIAN REGIONAL
REPORT, July 30, 1998, at 4. St. Petersburg, Perm oblast and Krasnoyarsk krai have re-
fused to sign the agreements. Khakasiya and Chelyabinsk have signed. See idi
317. Kirienko Seeks Constructive Relations with Tatarstan [hereinafter Kirienko],
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place-to bring all of Russia's regions, either expressly or implic-
itly within that "basic body of law," the Constitution.
Another recent announcement holds the key to the future of
the present federal structure. Soon, the government of Tatarstan
will begin negotiation on a new supplemental agreement on joint
budgetary relations with the central government. 318 The course of
these negotiations may determine the course of the next phase of
the Power-Sharing Treaty process. President Yeltsin has already
met with many republican leaders and told them that he "would
accept revised Power-Sharing Treaties with the republics in a way
that would give them more power than the oblasts and krais have
received. "319
If President Yeltsin embarks on a round of revision of the
Power-Sharing Treaties and redefines the difference between re-
publics and the other regions, yet again, it may eventually lead the
oblasts and krais to seek the same. This sort of back and forth be-
tween different groups of subjects could lead to the disintegration
of the Russian Federation.
There may still be hope that Yeltsin's administration will not
embark on this populist pandering to the regions. Former Prime
Minister Sergei Kirienko recently pronounced that when the
agreement expires, he would seek to negotiate a new agreement
that takes into account "fairness and the criteria used in relations
with other regions." 320 This may be what it takes to stabilize the
present situation.
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